Hello everyone,
yesterday during the State of the Onion stream, Georg mentioned a proposal that considers the implementation of a relay trust factor in order to prevent malicious operators from getting the bandwidth they want. I wanted to ask if there are any sources I can read into for more details about this? Or if more information could be provided on the proposal? It sounds a bit like this is going into the direction of nusenu's web of trust [1].
Garún
[1] https://nusenu.github.io/tor-relay-operator-ids-trust-information/
Hi!
Garún via network-health:
Hello everyone,
yesterday during the State of the Onion stream, Georg mentioned a proposal that considers the implementation of a relay trust factor in order to prevent malicious operators from getting the bandwidth they want. I wanted to ask if there are any sources I can read into for more details about this? Or if more information could be provided on the proposal? It sounds a bit like this is going into the direction of nusenu's web of trust [1].
First of all, "proposal" in my talk was not meant in the sense of a technical spec like nusenu's proposal. If you, e.g. watched a bit further along and saw Mike's talk then you probably recall hearing him talk about a proposal as well where several network security related topics should get addressed with. That's the same proposal, which is essentially a paper written for a potential funder in the hope they find it great and will pay us for working on that. If all goes well then we'll have indeed money from that funder for all of the work I mentioned in this email (including the bad-relays part) at the end of next year (as Mike said).
I think nusenu and we want to solve the same problem. However, I am not sure yet about their approach. I've been going over their proposal and asking questions/clarifications on the tor-relays@ mailing list where I think such a proposal should get discussed. You can follow the discussion along (and chime in! :)) there, where I mentioned and clarified parts we currently think about working on, too. I am not done with that yet, though. But I currently don't have time to work on that during my regular working hours. Instead, I put my volunteer hat on on weekends, which makes the whole process slower...
That said the links nusenu mentioned in the mail starting the proposal thread[1] are worth checking out to get up to speed on the general situation and on ideas floating around to make progress on the bad-relay issue.
Hope this helps, Georg
[1] https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2021-October/019854.html
Garún
[1] https://nusenu.github.io/tor-relay-operator-ids-trust-information/
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