ooni-talk August 2021

ooni-talk@lists.torproject.org

2 participants
5 discussions

[New Report] No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries
by Maria Xynou 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

Hello, Today, in collaboration with the *Citizen Lab* and *OutRight Action International*, we co-published a new research report, "*No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries*", which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The report is available on each of our websites: * OONI: https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countrie… * Citizen Lab: https://citizenlab.ca/2021/08/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-in-six-co… * OutRight Action International: https://outrightinternational.org/content/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorsh… Download the full (203-page) report here: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbti… *# About the report* We joined forces with OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab to examine the *blocking of LGBTIQ websites in 6 countries: *Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). We selected these countries because they are (a) known to serve block pages (i.e., pages that website visitors may see when access is restricted), which enable us to automatically confirm the blocking of LGBTIQ websites, and (b) known to censor LGBTIQ related content, based on prior research. We adopted a mixed methods research approach, combining *OONI network measurement analysis with interviews and literature research*. The timeframe that we selected for OONI data analysis was *June 1, 2016 to July 31, 2020*. To examine the impact of online LGBTIQ censorship, OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab interviewed LGBTIQ communities in the six countries. *# Summary of key findings* *1) Variation in the blocking of internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites vs. locally-relevant ones.* All six countries blocked LGBTIQ websites that are internationally-relevant and meant for an international audience (such as www.grindr.com, www.advocate.com, and ilga.org). In Malaysia and Indonesia, all local LGBTIQ websites tested (e.g., queerlapis.com and suarakita.org), however, were accessible during our analysis period, and therefore, it appears that both countries block internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites only. In contrast, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE blocked access to several local and regional LGBTIQ sites, in addition to blocking internationally-relevant LGBTIQ sites. *2) LGBTIQ websites on “culture and community” were blocked most often. *In Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, the most frequently blocked LGBTIQ websites were those that belong under the “Culture and Community” category. These are websites that aim primarily to create a sense of community among LGBTIQ individuals, as well as provide information about art and culture. This is not the case in Russia, however, where LGBTIQ websites under the “News Media" category instead presented the most blocking, while in the UAE, most of the LGBTIQ websites found to be blocked were no longer operational (categorized as “404 Not Found”). *3) Variation in how block pages are served for LGBTIQ websites.* ISPs in Indonesia and Malaysia serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking, whereas Iranian ISPs serve block pages primarily by means of DNS injection. In Russia, ISPs commonly make use of HTTP transparent proxies to serve blockpages, but some Russian ISPs serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking instead. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs deliver block pages to internet users through the use of censorship technologies. *4) Detection of censorship technologies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.* In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs serve block pages through the use of WireFilter technology, which is a network filtering device made for the ISP and commercial market, manufactured by Riyadh-based Sewar Technologies Ltd. In the UAE, we also observed blocking using a tool manufactured by Netsweeper, which is a Canadian company that sells internet filtering products to ISPs around the world. *5) Some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads.* Unlike other countries, some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads, suggesting the presence of financial incentives. We previously observed ads being served as part of censorship efforts in Egypt ( https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/). *6) Iran blocks the highest number of LGBTIQ URLs in our test lists. *Out of the six countries, the highest instance of LGBTIQ URL blocking was seen in Iran, where 75 unique LGBTIQ URLs were detected as blocked. In Iran, we also observed the blocking of www.outrightinternational.org, the website of OutRight Action International, one of this report’s authors. Further details and findings are available through our report: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbti… We thank OONI Probe users for contributing measurements, supporting this study. We also thank those who participated in interviews, sharing valuable insights into the realities and impact of LGBTIQ website censorship in their countries and regions. Thanks for taking the time to read and share this study! Kind regards, ~ OONI team.

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OONI Community Meeting: Tuesday, 31st August 2021
by Maria Xynou 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

Hello, The OONI team warmly welcomes you to join us next Tuesday for our monthly community meeting. *=> Where? *OONI Slack channel: https://slack.ooni.org/ (bridged with IRC: ircs://irc.oftc.net:6697/#ooni) *=> When?* Tuesday, *31st August 2021 at 14:00 UTC* (for 1 hour) Please add topics that you'd like to discuss during the meeting in this pad: https://pad.riseup.net/p/ooni-community-meeting-keep The monthly OONI community meetings aim to: * Collect community feedback on OONI tools & methodologies * Address questions in relation to the use of OONI tools and OONI data * Foster discussions on internet censorship issues * Receive updates from the community We hope you can join us! All the best, ~ OONI team

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[New posts] Mining OONI data + Brief introduction to OONI
by Maria Xynou 27 Aug '21

27 Aug '21

Hello friends, OONI's Federico recently published 2 new blog posts: 1) *A brief introduction to OONI*: https://ooni.org/post/brief-introduction-to-ooni/ 2) *Mining OONI data*: https://ooni.org/post/mining-ooni-data/ The first post provides a gentle introduction to OONI, without requiring readers to have a technical background. It explains some internet basics, and how OONI Probe detects blocking. The second post is for power users interesting in analyzing OONI data. It explains the structures of raw OONI data in S3 and provides information on how you can download it. We hope you find these useful! Cheers, ~ OONI team.

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[CFP] PTIM 2021 call for proposals is up
by Vasilis 26 Aug '21

26 Aug '21

Hello, The Pluggable Transport Implementers’ Meeting (PTIM) will take place from October 19 through 21, 2021. There is an open call for proposals; community sessions, lighting talks and workshops or other. The form is located here (no account required): https://cryptpad.fr/form/#/2/form/view/f9yaxadQGCClhvrt26sxwT2Gxq+CHC1q+eQ2… More info: https://www.pluggabletransports.info/blog/ptim2021-announcement/ Cheers, ~Vasilis -- PGP Fingerprint: 8FD5 CF5F 39FC 03EB B382 7470 5FBF 70B1 D126 0162 PGP Public Key: https://keys.openpgp.org/vks/v1/by-fingerprint/8FD5CF5F39FC03EBB38274705FBF…

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[New Report] Zambia blocks social media amid 2021 general election
by Maria Xynou 24 Aug '21

24 Aug '21

Hello, Today we published a new report titled: "*Zambia: Social media blocked amid 2021 general elections*". You can read the report here: https://ooni.org/post/2021-zambia-social-media-blocks-amid-elections/ In the report, we share OONI data (and technical observations) on the blocking of WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook amid Zambia's 2021 general election. OONI data on the testing of the WhatsApp mobile app and web interface ( web.whatsapp.com), Twitter and Facebook domains shows that: * Starting on 12th August 2021 (election day), all services started to present anomalies (but were accessible in previous years, up until 11th August 2021); * All services presented the same *HTTP failures caused by connection timeouts during the TLS handshake*, suggesting the potential use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology; * Connection timeouts (during the TLS handshake) were observed on *at least 7 AS networks* in Zambia; * Accessibility was restored by 14th August 2021 (and all subsequent measurements show that they remain accessible). The fact that WhatsApp, Twitter, and Facebook presented the same timing in terms of connectivity failures, and that they presented the same connection timeouts during the TLS handshake, suggests: * Coordination (among ISPs) in the implementation of social media blocks; * ISPs in Zambia implemented social media blocks using the same censorship techniques (further suggesting the use of specific censorship technology). Moreover, the timing of anomalies presented in OONI network measurement data is corroborated by widespread media reports and user reports from the ground on the blocking of these specific social media services. We thank OONI Probe users in Zambia who contributed measurements, supporting this study. ~ OONI team.

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ooni-talk August 2021