Hello,
Today, in collaboration with the *Citizen Lab* and *OutRight Action International*, we co-published a new research report, "*No Access: LGBTIQ Website Censorship in Six Countries*", which examines the blocking of LGBTIQ websites in Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
The report is available on each of our websites:
* OONI: https://ooni.org/post/2021-no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-six-countries...
* Citizen Lab: https://citizenlab.ca/2021/08/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorship-in-six-cou...
* OutRight Action International: https://outrightinternational.org/content/no-access-lgbtiq-website-censorshi...
Download the full (203-page) report here: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbtiq...
*# About the report*
We joined forces with OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab to examine the *blocking of LGBTIQ websites in 6 countries: *Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
We selected these countries because they are (a) known to serve block pages (i.e., pages that website visitors may see when access is restricted), which enable us to automatically confirm the blocking of LGBTIQ websites, and (b) known to censor LGBTIQ related content, based on prior research.
We adopted a mixed methods research approach, combining *OONI network measurement analysis with interviews and literature research*. The timeframe that we selected for OONI data analysis was *June 1, 2016 to July 31, 2020*. To examine the impact of online LGBTIQ censorship, OutRight Action International and the Citizen Lab interviewed LGBTIQ communities in the six countries.
*# Summary of key findings*
*1) Variation in the blocking of internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites vs. locally-relevant ones.* All six countries blocked LGBTIQ websites that are internationally-relevant and meant for an international audience (such as www.grindr.com, www.advocate.com, and ilga.org). In Malaysia and Indonesia, all local LGBTIQ websites tested (e.g., queerlapis.com and suarakita.org), however, were accessible during our analysis period, and therefore, it appears that both countries block internationally-relevant LGBTIQ websites only. In contrast, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE blocked access to several local and regional LGBTIQ sites, in addition to blocking internationally-relevant LGBTIQ sites.
*2) LGBTIQ websites on “culture and community” were blocked most often. *In Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, and Saudi Arabia, the most frequently blocked LGBTIQ websites were those that belong under the “Culture and Community” category. These are websites that aim primarily to create a sense of community among LGBTIQ individuals, as well as provide information about art and culture. This is not the case in Russia, however, where LGBTIQ websites under the “News Media" category instead presented the most blocking, while in the UAE, most of the LGBTIQ websites found to be blocked were no longer operational (categorized as “404 Not Found”).
*3) Variation in how block pages are served for LGBTIQ websites.* ISPs in Indonesia and Malaysia serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking, whereas Iranian ISPs serve block pages primarily by means of DNS injection. In Russia, ISPs commonly make use of HTTP transparent proxies to serve blockpages, but some Russian ISPs serve block pages by means of DNS hijacking instead. In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs deliver block pages to internet users through the use of censorship technologies.
*4) Detection of censorship technologies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.* In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, ISPs serve block pages through the use of WireFilter technology, which is a network filtering device made for the ISP and commercial market, manufactured by Riyadh-based Sewar Technologies Ltd. In the UAE, we also observed blocking using a tool manufactured by Netsweeper, which is a Canadian company that sells internet filtering products to ISPs around the world.
*5) Some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads.* Unlike other countries, some block pages in Russia contained affiliate ads, suggesting the presence of financial incentives. We previously observed ads being served as part of censorship efforts in Egypt ( https://ooni.org/post/egypt-internet-censorship/).
*6) Iran blocks the highest number of LGBTIQ URLs in our test lists. *Out of the six countries, the highest instance of LGBTIQ URL blocking was seen in Iran, where 75 unique LGBTIQ URLs were detected as blocked. In Iran, we also observed the blocking of www.outrightinternational.org, the website of OutRight Action International, one of this report’s authors.
Further details and findings are available through our report: https://ooni.org/documents/2021-lgbtiq-website-censorship-report/2021-lgbtiq...
We thank OONI Probe users for contributing measurements, supporting this study.
We also thank those who participated in interviews, sharing valuable insights into the realities and impact of LGBTIQ website censorship in their countries and regions.
Thanks for taking the time to read and share this study!
Kind regards,
~ OONI team.