Hello,
Today, in collaboration with DefendDefenders, Defenders Protection Initiative, and IODA, we co-published a new research report examining the recent internet disruption in Uganda amid its 2021 general election.
Our report is available here: https://ooni.org/post/2021-uganda-general-election-blocks-and-outage/
We based our investigation on:
* OONI measurements collected from Uganda: https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-01-23&since=2020-12-23&p...
* OONI experiments using the `miniooni` research client (which we plan to eventually integrate into the OONI Probe apps)
* Public data sources monitoring internet outages (IODA data, Google traffic data, Oracle Internet Intelligence data, and CloudFlare Radar data)
In the days leading up to Uganda’s 2021 general election, ISPs blocked access to the Google Play Store (hampering people’s ability to download apps), as well as to a number of social media apps (including WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, and Telegram) and websites (such as facebook.com) – regardless of OTT tax payment.
Access to certain circumvention tool websites (such as protonvpn.com) was blocked as well, though both Tor and Psiphon worked throughout the election period.
Starting from the eve of Uganda’s 2021 general election (in the evening of 13th January 2021), Uganda was disconnected from the internet entirely.
The country experienced a 4-day internet outage (which included election day), as shown through several public data sources: Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA), Oracle’s Internet Intelligence Map, Cloudflare Radar, and Google traffic data. In our report, we also share network-level analysis of the internet outage based on IODA data.
The internet outage is further corroborated by the absence of OONI measurements from Uganda during this time period (since OONI Probe requires internet connectivity to perform tests), as well as by the drastic drop in Tor users and Psiphon users during this period.
Even though internet connectivity in Uganda was restored on 18th January 2021, access to social media and circumvention platforms remained blocked.
Notably, Ugandan ISPs only appear to have started blocking access to YouTube on 18th January 2021, even though the platform is not included on the OTT list of taxed platforms.
You can continue to monitor ongoing internet censorship in Uganda though OONI data (which is openly published in real-time): https://explorer.ooni.org/search?until=2021-01-23&since=2020-12-23&p...
We thank OONI Probe users in Uganda who contributed measurements, making this study possible.
Best,
Maria.
ooni-talk@lists.torproject.org