tor-dev January 2017

tor-dev@lists.torproject.org

32 participants
27 discussions

[release] Onionoo 3.2-1.1.0
by iwakeh 30 Jan '17

30 Jan '17

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi there! Another release of Onionoo is now available here: https://dist.torproject.org/onionoo/3.2-1.1.0/ Besides some technical improvements that are listed in the changelog [0] this release contains a protocol extensions [1]: * Extended order parameter to "first_seen" and added response meta data fields that facilitate paging access to Oninoo data (see [2] for details). * A bug was fixed, that prevents noting bridges as first seen on January 1, 1970 when in fact they were never mentioned in a bridge network status and only learned about from their self-published bridge server descriptors (see ticket [3]). * The data on the main Onionoo instance [4] was cleaned to not report the wrong first_seen dates anymore. Please direct comments and questions to the metrics-team mailing list [5]. Cheers, iwakeh [0] https://gitweb.torproject.org/onionoo.git/plain/CHANGELOG.md?id=5b219203b87… [1] https://onionoo.torproject.org/protocol.org [2] https://onionoo.torproject.org/protocol.html#responses [3] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20994 [4] https://onionoo.torproject.org [5] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/metrics-team -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJYjv3nAAoJEPeEx9Sa/gviBU0P/j/ABxgGW7w46SHALGqJWazC /0bF3OipaNQc8UXwejwh7GGH9IZJxk1W5IUMrf9Fu7USTrcmCmhZowBPNbh6vc64 QnFtOPgDbm/S7lURhLr56UIb68zpbbtCQu3++mj2r4oep3g3avKOcIFyNYsLnM8z qGhLRIhSyJtHC0ZLojzDgRzT3gD4qKiU79rofJysaevoHRzusSDlHB7m/LBLcGz3 NFBemfB3NtAWJcl8G50hileMp2uLnepZ5eyfWV1PmNvT3j96x4L7sUwVywdKHzjs P31R7ysgT3oYf2lcwsyCAZLrBF+ZklVOGivHcxTByVJf7At4N/j86V5iSr0I7H4n 3KKdIjzFjwYLN8E9LUeqiD+v4+a4Z+tJO56XV2O0P4r3szMaSxVK13XNriHlEp6A 3rKvyJDpGS40Kijna0H5E7NdHS6za1S2Pj/DJr62WFft/6lz48cm6HdzS7IQTRGP zHYuYcT5tMn1jS72PQmIJd8x7hP8C0G18lp9vs6au/S4rfw+/XXgmpzYJM5JQjKu jgFCNuw9V8egk8v9f25K3viv+MT19zZjrCyKTNFig28Fda0EQqLvDYiWBbNBqmyt dtd0JOYx78ynVXUBue9dPGg2YvLXhVuftdESpkxMzjGxakFRrLD2klokn9sXT9Rf i2r5Ugu0gYqkVb93DcEy =+jNS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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tor 0.2.9.9 gcc 4.2.1
by grarpamp 30 Jan '17

30 Jan '17

Ancient gcc says src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN' discards qualifiers from pointer target type src/or/connection.c:1843: warning: passing argument 1 of 'TO_OR_CONN' discards qualifiers from pointer target type src/test/test_dir.c:3700: warning: assuming signed overflow does not occur when assuming that (X - c) >= X is always true src/test/test_dir.c:3828: warning: assuming signed overflow does not occur when assuming that (X - c) >= X is always true src/test/vote_descriptors.inc:93: warning: string length '4135' is greater than the length '4095' ISO C99 compilers are required to support src/test/test_microdesc.c:654: warning: string length '5844' is greater than the length '4095' ISO C99 compilers are required to support src/test/test_descriptors.inc:305: warning: string length '10571' is greater than the length '4095' ISO C99 compilers are required to support

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onionoo.tpo stuck at 2016-05-13 12:00
by nusenu 29 Jan '17

29 Jan '17

Hi Karsten, I was surprised that ornetradar did not send a single email for yesterday's new relays. After looking into it, it turned out it is an onionoo problem. "relays_published":"2016-05-13 12:00:00" https://onionoo.torproject.org/details?limit=4 regards, nusenu

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./configure in 0.2.9.9 is ~broken?
by loki der quaeler 26 Jan '17

26 Jan '17

Hi - Trying to configure 0.2.9.9’s build with this command: ./configure --with-libevent-dir=/usr/local/lib --with-openssl-dir=/usr/local/openssl/ fails with: checking for libevent directory... configure: WARNING: We found the libraries for libevent, but we could not find the C header files. You may need to install a devel package. configure: WARNING: On most Redhat-based systems, you can get headers for libevent by installing the libevent-devel RPM package configure: error: Missing headers; unable to proceed. whereas this worked (and still works) when being issued against 0.2.8.12’s source code I have libevent-devel (and libevent-headers) installed on my system - and have been building tor on the system for many years now. Does this ring a bell with anyone?

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Proposal 274: A Name System API for Tor Onion Services
by George Kadianakis 26 Jan '17

26 Jan '17

Hello list, we've been busy discussing secure name systems for the past few months, and how we could integrate them with Tor. We had a few people ask us for precise interfaces, so here is an attempt for a modular name system API. It's largely based on the PT API, which has been pretty successful. The proposal was brainstormed on a Sunday morning in Seattle between Yawning, David and me. I wrote the actual proposal contents so any innacuracies, impossibilities and errors are mine :) If people like it and are interested in implementing it, we can draft out an implementation plan for any person who wants to go for it. But for now, please consider this proposal text as a draft that is meant to be improved from this list's feedback. Have fun and looking forward to your comments (and code). --- Filename: 274-naming-layer-api.txt Title: A Name System API for Tor Onion Services Author: George Kadianakis, Yawning Angel, David Goulet Created: 04-Oct-2016 Status: Draft Table Of Contents: 1. Introduction 1.1. Motivation 1.2. Design overview and rationale 2. System Specification 2.1. System overview [SYSTEMOVERVIEW] 2.2. System Illustration 2.3. System configuration [TORRC] 2.3.1. Tor name resolution logic 2.4. Name system initialization [INITPROTOCOL] 2.5. Name resolution using NS API 2.5.1. Message format 2.5.2. RESOLVED status codes 2.5.3. Further name resolution behavior 2.6. Cancelling a name resolution request 2.7. Launching name plugins [INITENVVARS] 2.8. Name plugin workflow [NSBEHAVIOR] 2.8.1. Name plugin shutdown [NSSHUTDOWN] 2.9. Further details of stdin/stdout communication 2.9.1. Message Format 3. Discussion 3.1. Using second-level domains instead of tld 3.2. Name plugins handling all tlds '*' 3.3. Deployment strategy 3.4. Miscellaneous discussion topics 4. Acknowledgements A.1: Example communication Tor <-> name plugin [PROTOEXAMPLE] A.2: Example plugins [PLUGINEXAMPLES] 1. Introduction This proposal specifies a modular API for integrating name systems with Tor. 1.1. Motivation Tor onion service addresses are decentralized and self-authenticated but they are not human-memorable (e.g. 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion). This is a source of poor usability, since Internet users are familiar with the convenient naming of DNS and are not used to addresses being random text. In particular, onion addresses are currently composed of 16 random base32 characters, and they look like this: 3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion vwakviie2ienjx7t.onion idnxcnkne4qt76tg.onion vwakviie2ienjx6t.onion When Proposal 224 get deployed, onion addresses will become even bigger: 53 base32 characters. That's: llamanymityx4fi3l6x2gyzmtmgxjyqyorj9qsb5r543izcwymle.onion lfels7g3rbceenuuqmpsz45z3lswakqf56n5i3bvqhc22d5rrsza.onion odmmeotgcfx65l5hn6ejkaruvai222vs7o7tmtllszqk5xbysola.onion qw3yvgovok3dsarhqephpu2pkiwzjdk2fgdfwwf3tb3vgzxr5kba.onion Over the years Tor users have come up with various ad-hoc ways of handling onion addresses. For example people memorize them, or use third-party centralized directories, or just google them everytime. We believe that the UX problem of non-human-memorable problems is not actually solved with the above ad-hoc solutions and remains a critical usability barrier that prevents onion services from being used by a wider audience. 1.2. Design overview and rationale During the past years there has been lots of research on secure naming and various such systems have been proposed (e.g. GNS, Namecoin, etc.). Turns out securely naming things is a very hard research problem, and hence none of the proposed systems is a clear winner: all of them carry various trade-offs. Furthermore, none of the proposed systems has seen widespread use so far, which makes it even harder to pick a single project. Given the plenitude of options, one approach to decide which system is best is to make various decent name systems available and let the Tor community and the sands of time pick the winner. Also, it might be that there is no single winner, and perhaps different specialized name system should be used in different situations. We believe that by getting secure name systems actually get utilized by real users, the whole field will mature and existing systems will get battle-hardened. Hence, the contribution of this proposal is a modular Name System API (NSA) that allows developers to integrate their own name systems in Tor. The interface design is name-system-agnostic, and it's heavily based on the pluggable transports API (proposal 180). It should be flexible enough to accommodate all sorts of name systems (see [PLUGINEXAMPLES]). 2. System Specification A developer that wants to integrate a name system with Tor needs to first write a wrapper that understands the Tor Name System API (NS API). Using the Name System API, Tor asks the name system to perform name queries, and receives the query results. The NS API works using environment variables and stdin/stdout communication. It aims to be portable and easy to implement. 2.1. System overview [SYSTEMOVERVIEW] Here is an overview of the Tor name system: Alice, a Tor user, can activate various name systems by editing her torrc file and specifying which tld each name system is responsible for. For this section, let's consider a simple fictional name system, unicorn, which magically maps domains with the .corn tld to the correct onion address. Here it is: OnionNamePlugin 0 .corn /usr/local/bin/unicorn After Alice enables the unicorn plugin, she attempts connecting to elephantforum.corn. Tor will intercept the SOCKS request, and use the executable at /usr/local/bin/unicorn to query the unicorn name system for elephantforum.corn. Tor communicates with the unicorn plugin using the Tor NS API through which name queries and their results can be transported using stdin/stdout. If elephantforum.corn corresponds to an onion address in the unicorn name system, unicorn should return the onion address to Tor using the Tor NS API. Tor must then internally rewrite the elephantforum.corn address to the actual onion address, and initiate a connection to it. 2.2. System Illustration Here is a diagram illustrating how the Tor Name System API works. The name system used in this example is GNS, but there is nothing GNS-specific here and GNS could be swapped for any other name system (like hosts files, or Namecoin). The example below illustrates how a user who types debian.zkey in their Tor browser gets redirected to sejnfjrq6szgca7v.onion after Tor consults the GNS network. Please revisit this illustration after reading the rest of the proposal. | $~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~$ | 1. $ 4. GNS magic!! $ | User: SOCKS CONNECT to $ debian.zkey -> sejnfjrq6szgca7v.onion$ | http://debian.zkey/ $~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~$~~~~~~~$ | $ +-----|-----------------------------------------+ $ |+----v-----+ 2. +---------+| 3. $ ||Tor | debian.zkey |Tor || debian.zkey +-$-------+ ||Networking------------------------->Naming -------------------------> | ||Submodule | |Submodule|| Tor Name System API | GNS | || <------------------------- <------------------------- wrapper| || | 6. | ||5. | | |+----|-----+ sejnfjrq6szgca7v.onion +---------+|sejnfjrq6szgca7v.onion +---------+ +-----|-----------------------------------------+ | 7. | Tor: Connect to | http://sejnfjrq6szgca7v.onion/ v 2.3. System configuration [TORRC] As demonstrated in [SYSTEMOVERVIEW], a Tor user who wants to use a name system has to edit their configuration file appropriately. Here is the torrc line format: OnionNamePlugin <priority> <tld> <path> where <priority> is a positive integer denoting the priority with which this name plugin should be consulted. <tld> is a string which restricts the scope of this plugin to a particular tld. Finally, <path> is a filesystem path to an executable that speaks the Tor Name System API and can act as an intermediary between Tor and the name system. For example here is a snippet from a torrc file: OnionNamePlugin 0 .hosts /usr/local/bin/local-hosts-file OnionNamePlugin 1 .zkey /usr/local/bin/gns-tor-wrapper OnionNamePlugin 2 .bit /usr/local/bin/namecoin-tor-wrapper OnionNamePlugin 3 .scallion /usr/local/bin/community-hosts-file 2.3.1. Tor name resolution logic When Tor receives a SOCKS request to an address that has a name plugin assigned to it, it needs to perform a query for that address using that name plugin. If there are multiple name plugins that correspond to the requested address, Tor queries all relevant plugins sorted by their priority value, until one of them returns a successful result. If two plugins have the same priority value, Tor MUST abort. If all plugins fail to successfuly perform the name resolution, Tor SHOULD default to using the exit node for name resolution. XXX or not? because of leaks? 2.4. Name system initialization [INITPROTOCOL] When Tor finds OnionNamePlugin lines in torrc, it launches and initializes their respective executables. When launching name plugins, Tor sets various environment variables to pass data to the name plugin (e.g. NS API version, state directory, etc.). More information on the environment variables at [INITENVVARS]. After a name plugin initializes and parses all needed environment variables, it communicates with Tor using its stdin/stdout. The first line that a name plugin sends to stdout signifies that it's ready to receive name queries. This line looks like this: INIT <VERSION> <STATUS_CODE> [<STATUS_MSG>] where VERSION is the Tor NS API protocol version that the plugin supports, STATUS_CODE is an integer status code, and STATUS_MSG is an optional string error message. STATUS_CODE value 0 is reserved for "success", and all other integers are error codes. See [PROTOEXAMPLE] for an example of this protocol. 2.5. Name resolution using NS API Here is how actual name resolution requests are performed in NS API. 2.5.1. Message format When Tor receives a SOCKS request to an address with a tld that has a name plugin assigned to it, Tor performs an NS API name query for that address. Tor does this by printing lines on the name plugin stdout as follows: RESOLVE <QUERY_ID> <NAME_STRING> where QUERY_ID is a unique integer corresponding to this query, and NAME_STRING is the name to be queried. When the name plugin completes the name resolution, it prints the following line in its stdout: RESOLVED <QUERY_ID> <STATUS_CODE> <RESULT> where QUERY_ID is the corresponding query ID and STATUS_CODE is an integer status code. RESULT is the resolution result (an onion address) or an error message if the resolution was not succesful. See [PROTOEXAMPLE] for an example of this protocol. XXX Should <RESULT> be optional in the case of failure? 2.5.2. RESOLVED status codes Name plugins can deliver the following status codes: 0 -- The name resolution was successful. 1 -- Name resolution generic failure. 2 -- Name tld not recognized. 3 -- Name not registered. 4 -- Name resolution timeout exceeded. XXX add more status codes here as needed 2.5.3. Further name resolution behavior Tor and name plugins MAY cache name resolution results in memory as needed. Caching results on disk should be avoided. Tor SHOULD abort (or cancel) an ongoing name resolution request, if it takes more than NAME_RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT seconds. XXX NAME_RESOLUTION_TIMEOUT = ??? Tor MUST validate that the resolution result is a valid .onion name. XXX should we also accept IPs and regular domain results??? XXX perhaps we should make sure that results are not names that need additional name resolution to avoid endless loops. e.g. imagine some sort of loop like this: debian.zkey -> debian-bla.zkey -> debian.zkey -> etc. 2.6. Cancelling a name resolution request Tor might need to cancel an ongoing name resolution request (e.g. because a timeout passed, or the client is not interested in that address anymore). In this case, Tor sends the following line to the plugin stdout as follows: CANCEL <QUERY_ID> to which the name plugin, after performing the cancellation, SHOULD answer with: CANCELED <QUERY_ID> 2.7. Launching name plugins [INITENVVARS] As described in [INITPROTOCOL], when Tor launches a name plugin, it sets certain environment variables. At a minimum, it sets (in addition to the normal environment variables inherited from Tor): "TOR_NS_STATE_LOCATION" -- A filesystem directory path where the plugin should store state if it wants to. This directory is not required to exist, but the plugin SHOULD be able to create it if it doesn't. The plugin MUST NOT store state elsewhere. Example: TOR_NS_STATE_LOCATION=/var/lib/tor/ns_state/ "TOR_NS_PROTO_VERSION" -- To tell the plugin which versions of this configuration protocol Tor supports. Future versions will give a comma-separated list. Plugins MUST accept comma-separated lists containing any version that they recognize, and MUST work correctly even if some of the versions they don't recognize are non-numeric. Valid version characters are non-space, non-comma printing ASCII characters. Example: TOR_NS_PROTO_VERSION=1,1a,2,4B "TOR_NS_PLUGIN_OPTIONS" -- Specifies configuration options for this name plugin as a semicolon-separated list of k=v strings with options that are to be passed to the plugin. Colons, semicolons, equal signs and backslashes MUST be escaped with a backslash. If there are no arguments that need to be passed to any of the plugins, "TOR_NS_PLUGIN_OPTIONS" MAY be omitted. For example consider the following options for the "banana" name plugin: TOR_NS_PLUGIN_OPTIONS=timeout=5;url=https://bananacake.com Will pass to banana the parameters 'timeout=5' and 'url=https://bananacake.com'. XXX Do we like this option-passing interface? Do we have any lessons from our PT experiences? XXX Add ControlPort/SocksPort environment variables. See [PROTOEXAMPLE] for an example of this environment 2.8. Name plugin workflow [NSBEHAVIOR] Name plugins follow the following workflow: 1) Tor sets the required environment values and launches the name plugin as a sub-process (fork()/exec()). See [INITENVVARS]. 2) The name plugin checks its environment, and determines the supported NS API versions using the env variable TOR_NS_PROTO_VERSION. 2.1) If there are no compatible versions, the name plugin writes an INIT message with a failure status code as in [INITPROTOCOL], and then shuts down. 3) The name plugin parses and handles the rest of the environment values. 3.1) If the environment variables are malformed, or otherwise invalid, the name plugin writes an INIT message with a failure status code as in [INITPROTOCOL], and then shuts down. 4) After the name plugin completely initializes, it sends a successful INIT message to stdout as in [INITPROTOCOL]. Then it continues monitoring its stdin for incoming RESOLVE messages. 6) When the name plugin receives a RESOLVE message, it performs the name resolution and replies with the appropriate RESOLVED message. 7) Upon being signaled to terminate by the parent process [NSSHUTDOWN], the name plugin gracefully shuts down. 2.8.1. Name plugin shutdown [NSSHUTDOWN] To ensure clean shutdown of all name plugins when Tor shuts down, the following rules apply for name plugins: Name plugins MUST handle OS specific mechanisms to gracefully terminate (e.g. SIGTERM). Name plugins SHOULD monitor their stdin and exit gracefully when it is closed. 2.9. Further details of stdin/stdout communication 2.9.1. Message Format Tor communicates with its name plugins by writing NL-terminated lines to stdout. The line metaformat is <Line> ::= <Keyword> <OptArgs> <NL> <Keyword> ::= <KeywordChar> | <Keyword> <KeywordChar> <KeyWordChar> ::= <any US-ASCII alphanumeric, dash, and underscore> <OptArgs> ::= <Args>* <Args> ::= <SP> <ArgChar> | <Args> <ArgChar> <ArgChar> ::= <any US-ASCII character but NUL or NL> <SP> ::= <US-ASCII whitespace symbol (32)> <NL> ::= <US-ASCII newline (line feed) character (10)> Tor MUST ignore lines with keywords that it doesn't recognize. 3. Discussion 3.1. Using second-level domains instead of tld People have suggested that users should try to connect to reddit.zkey.onion instead of reddit.zkey. That is, we should always preserve .onion as the tld, and only utilize second-level domains for naming. The argument for this is that this way users cannot accidentally leak addresses to DNS, as the .onion domain is reserved by RFC 7686. The counter-argument here is that this might be confusing to users since they are not used to the second-level domain being special (e.g. co.uk). Also, what happens when someone registers a 16-character name, that matches the length of a vanilla onion address? We should consider the concerns here and take the right decision. 3.2. Name plugins handling all tlds '*' In [TORRC], we assigned a single tld to each name plugin. Should we also accept catch-all tlds using '*'? I'm afraid that this way a name system could try to resolve even normal domains like reddit.com . Perhaps we trust the name plugin itself, but maybe the name system network could exploit this? Also, the catch-all tld will probably cause some engineering complications in this proposal (as it did for PTs). 3.3. Deployment strategy We need to devise a deployment strategy that will allow us to improve the UX of our users as soon as possible, but without taking hasty, sloppy or uneducated decisions. For starters, we should make it easy for developers to write wrappers around their secure name systems. We should develop libraries that speak the NS API protocol and can be used to quickly write wrappers. Similar libraries were quite successful during pluggable transport deployment; see pyptlib and goptlib. In the beginning, name plugins should be third-party applications that can be installed by interested users manually or through package managers. Users will also have to add the appropriate OnionNamePlugin line to their torrc. This will be a testing phase, and also a community-growing phase. After some time, and when we get a better idea of how name plugins work for the community, we can start considering how to make them more easily usable. For example, we can start by including some name plugins into TBB in an optional opt-in fashion. We should be careful here, as people have real incentives for attacking name systems and we should not put our users unwillingly in danger. 3.4. Miscellaneous discussion topics 1. The PT spec tries hard so that a single executable can expose multiple PTs. In this spec, it's clear that each executable is a single name plugin. Is this OK or a bad idea? Should we change interfaces so that each name plugin has an identifier, and then use that identifier for things? 2. Should we make our initialization protocol _identical_ to the PT API initialization protocol? That is, use ENV-ERROR etc. instead of INT? 3. Does it make sense to support reverse queries, from .onion to names? So that people auto-learn the names of the onions they use? 4. Acknowledgements Proposal details discussed during Tor hackfest in Seattle between Yawning, David and me. Thanks to Lunar and indolering for more discussion and feedback. Appendix A.1: Example communication Tor <-> name plugin [PROTOEXAMPLE] Environemnt variables: TOR_NS_STATE_LOCATION=/var/lib/tor/ns_state TOR_NS_PROTO_VERSION=1 TOR_NS_PLUGIN_OPTIONS=timeout=5;cache=/home/user/name_cache Messages between Tor and the banana name plugin: Name plugin (banana) -> Tor: INIT 1 0 Tor -> Name plugin (banana): RESOLVE 1 daewonskate.banana Name plugin (banana) -> Tor: RESOLVED 1 0 jqkscnkne4qt91iq.onion Tor -> Name plugin (banana): RESOLVE 1 architecturedirect.zkey Name plugin (banana) -> Tor (banana): RESOLVE 1 2 "zkey not recognized tld" Tor -> Name plugin (banana): RESOLVE 1 origamihub.banana Name plugin (banana) -> Tor (banana): RESOLVE 1 2 wdxfpaxar4dg12vd.onion Appendix A.2: Example plugins [PLUGINEXAMPLES] Here are a few examples of name plugins for brainstorming: a) Simplest plugin: A local hosts file. Basically a local petname system that maps names to onion addresses. b) A remote hosts file. A centralized community hosts file that people trust. c) Multiple remote hosts files. People can add their own favorite community hosts file. d) Multiple remote hosts files with notaries and reputation trust. Like moxie's convergence tool but for names. e) GNS f) OnioNS g) Namecoin/Blockstart

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log: ORPort/DirPort address does not match descriptor address
by nusenu 24 Jan '17

24 Jan '17

Hi, how bad is it to simply ignore ORPort/DirPort address mismatch log entry on a relay behind (1:1) NAT? I assume tor figures out the public IPv4 address anyway, no? The IPv4 ORPort address 192.168.1.1 does not match the descriptor address 1.2.3.4. If you have a static public IPv4 address, use 'Address <IPv4>' and 'OutboundBindAddress <IPv4>'. If you are behind a NAT, use two ORPort lines: 'ORPort <PublicPort> NoListen' and 'ORPort <InternalPort> NoAdvertise'. I'm explicitly specifying (private) IP addresses in ORPort/DirPort (and OutboundBindAddress) lines to avoid binding to the same ports when running >2 instances (with >1 public IP). https://github.com/nusenu/ansible-relayor/issues/101 thanks, nusenu

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GAEuploader
by Katherine Li 23 Jan '17

23 Jan '17

Hello Tor-Dev Community, GAE(Google App Engine) uploader has just released v1.0-beta. GAEuploader enables clients to set up their own private meek-google in one easy step: just run it and paste the bridge line into Tor Browser. Background information: Meek <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/meek#Overview> is pluggable transport that uses domain fronting. Meek-google got suspended <https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-June/041699.html>, but clients can set up their own Google App Engine app and configure their Tor Browser accordingly. However, the process of creating and deploying the Google App Engine can be confusing. GAEuploader significantly simplifies this process for clients. I would really appreciate user testing on GAEuploader. You can download it at: https://github.com/katherinelitor/GAEuploader/releases README: https://github.com/katherinelitor/GAEuploader Tor wiki page, containing step-by-step screenshots of how to use: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GAEuploader *GAEuploader runs on Mac or Linux, but currently does not support Windows. *GAEuploader uses the Google Cloud SDK <https://cloud.google.com/sdk/docs/#linux>. If you are interested in how GAEuploader works, the README contains the list of commands that were run. If you have any questions, feedback or bug reports, please email me at katherineli.tor(a)gmail.com. I will respond promptly. Best, Katherine Li

3 2

txtorcon support for Twisted 12, 13, 14
by meejah 20 Jan '17

20 Jan '17

I am considering dropping support for Twisted 12, 13 and 14 in the next txtorcon release. Also, TLS support (i.e. pyOpenSSL) will become mandatory as well (that is, the dependency will be on twisted[tls]). Twisted 12 is only there because of Debian wheezy. Twisted 13 is for wheezy-backports and 14 is for jessie ("stable"). jessie-backports has 16.2.0 and stretch has 16.6.0 Hence I do not believe upgrading this dependency will be a problem for Debian packaging. I do not know the implications for other distributions. Feedback requested if this will negatively affect you! -- meejah

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Release: sandboxed-tor-browser-0.0.3
by Yawning Angel 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

Hello, I just tagged sandboxed-tor-browser 0.0.3. Binaries will be built when the next Tor Browser build happens (soon). The dependencies (both build and runtime) have changed, end users should install `libnotify` in the unlikely event that it is not already present, though basic functionality should not be broken even if it is missing. The major changes since last version are: * 32 bit x86 support has been deprecated. * Numerous installer/updater improvements including periodic background update checks (requires libnotify for notifications) and using `.onions` when fetching installer/updater metadata. * Fixes for various crash/functionality bugs, including problems relating to certain versions of bubblewrap failing to launch with errors related to `setsid`[0]. Full details are available in the ChangeLog, and the code is still at https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser/sandboxed-tor-browser.git/ Regards, -- Yawning Angel [0]: If people are encountering this, particularly with the Debian package, either upgrade `sandboxed-tor-browser` to the new release, or update bubblewrap to 0.1.7 or later.

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RFC: Tor long-term support policy
by Nick Mathewson 18 Jan '17

18 Jan '17

Hi, all! This is a draft for a tor long-term support policy for the program "tor". Please let me know what you think. It's based on earlier work and surveys, but it isn't final till we say it is, and it needs more commentary. Please keep in mind that dropping support for any old release is an inconvenience to some nice busy people, and that supporting any old release is an inconvenience to other nice busy people. Therefore, "don't inconvenience anybody" is not a viable goal here: instead we are stuck with a balancing act. Also please remember the bikeshed. ;) http://bikeshed.com/ == Background == In the past, Tor has had no actual policy for how long we support older releases of the core "tor" network program. We've aimed for informal rules like "support old releases as long as it isn't too much trouble," or "support old releases as long as a lot of people really need it," but these aren't working so well with our new release schedule. The good thing about our new release schedule is that we try to put out two stable release series per year, when previously we were finishing release series once every ~18 months. But this means that, to support the last N years of releases, we need to support three times as many older release series as we did before. This won't scale, and probably isn't a good use of our time. Therefore, we're adopting a practice from several other free software projects with a rapid release schedule: we are going to support some Tor releases for different amounts of time than others. == Levels of support == Here's the plan. * Every new release series will be supported for at least nine months after it becomes stable, and for at least three months after another release series becomes stable. Example: * The first 0.2.8.x stable release was released in August 2016. So it will be supported until at least 9 months later, in May 2017. But if the first 0.2.9.x stable release had not been released until April 2017, we'd keep supporting 0.2.8.x for another 3 months past that point, to July 2017. * Occasionally, we will designate some Tor release series as "long-term support" releases. These will be supported for an amount of time to be announced in advance -- typically, for 3 years. * For the release series that exist today, we will support them according to the schedule at the end of this document. == What does support entail? == For all supported releases, we intend: * Information needed to connect to the Tor network (directory authorities, fallback directories, geoip tables) will be kept up-to-date. * Important security issues will get fixed. * Major stability issues will get fixed. * Portability regressions will get fixed. * Portability bugs to major supported platforms will get fixed. For the most recent supported stable release only: * Misleading documentation will get fixed. * Smaller bugs that significantly impact user experience will get fixed. We do NOT expect: * That directory authorities will be able to run any but the two most recent stable releases. * That unsupported releases will all work on the Tor network. * That unsupported releases will all fail to work on the Tor network. * That older supported releases will provide the same privacy as the newer ones. == The obligatory disclaimer == This document is about plans, not promises. We'll try hard to follow through on these plans, but it's always possible that something unexpected will happen and we'll need to choose between following this policy to the letter and maintaining our users' security. If that happens, we'll aim for protecting our users. == Plan for current releases == 0.2.4.x, 0.2.6.x, and 0.2.7.x, will all receive at least one more stable release. Support for them will end on 1 August 2017. 0.2.8.x will be supported until 1 January 2018. 0.2.5.x is retroactively declared an LTS release, and will be supported until 1 May 2018. 0.2.9.x is an LTS release, and will be supported until at least 1 January 2020.

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tor-dev January 2017