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anonym:
I might be misunderstanding what you and Patrick mean with "impossible" (or rather, which use cases are impossible) w.r.t. using Tor Launcher outside of the Tor Browser; Tails uses the Tor Launcher shipped in Tor Browser, but it's run as a stand-alone XUL application (`firefox --app ...`), so the *web* browser isn't started as part of it. [1] One could even run it using Iceweasel/Firefox, i.e. completely without Tor Browser.
Thank you very much for your explaination, anonym! I did find my words misleading here. I have corrected my mistakes. How do you like this one: " Currently, the Tor Launcher is shipped with the Tor Browser Bundle and heavily relies on the Tor Browser for its implementation. Although thanks to the great efforts([[1]](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_loca l-hooks/06-adduser_tor-launcher?h=devel), [[2]](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-hooks/ 10-tbb?h=devel), [[3]](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-includ es/usr/local/sbin/tails-tor-launcher?h=devel), [[4]](https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-includ es/usr/local/bin/tor-launcher?h=devel)) of Tails, the Tor Launcher can be run as a stand-alone XUL application currently, since the XUL will not be supported by mozilla in Firefox ESR branch [some time next year](https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2016/11/23/add-ons-in-2017/), that implementation may not work for a long time. Beiseds, I agree with the Whonix core developer Patrick Schleizer that "the Tor Browser Bundle has its kind of users. system Tor (refers to Tor from packages.debian.org or deb.torproject.org) users, where Tor runs as daemon, is used in different ways for different purposes".
Therefore, although anon-connection-wizard is a Python-clone of the Tor luancher, since all its dependencies are already in Debian and already packaged, it can still serve as a really useful tool for the system Tor users or a loose coupling substituition to the Tor Launcher. "
That said, this approach will not be viable any more some time next year when the Firefox ESR branch drops XUL support and Tor Launcher is deprecated upstream.
Thank you so much for pointing out the fact. It makes the anon-connection-wizard project even more meaningful and helpful because it may serve as a substitution to the Tor Launcher in the future. I have add the point to my proposal!
It remains to see how the replacement of Tor Launcher will look, it might still work for Tails. However, if anon-connection-wizard would be a (more or less) drop-in replacement for Tor Launcher in Tails, that would be immensely helpful since we'd have a solution that will be guaranteed to work for us without much work.
I am really glad to hear that my project may potentially be helpful to Tails. If this can happen one day in the future, it can benifit even more Tor users.
And I guess as long as the UX is more or less identical to the new Tor Launcher and rapidly adapts to changes, and there are good translations, we'd probably prefer it over the new Tor Launcher, since it probably will be even harder to decouple from the web browser.
The UX is a main part of the anon-connection-wizard proposal. During the summer, I will mainly focus on the improvement of verbal instructions and the user interface instructions in anon-connection-wizard. Patrick has helped me to get the latest paper by Linda on tor-launcher usability, so that I can redesign the anon-connection-wizard basing on some solid research findings. Please look forward to it :)
I am not worried too much about the translation actually. If the anon-connection-wizard is good and useful enough, maybe I can turn to the Tor Project translation [team](https://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/) for help. The team is very efficient and active.
BTW could you please tell me where I can find more about the development progress of the new Tor Launcher? I believe some communication and collaboration between us will be benefitial to both the anon-connection-wizard and the new Tor Launcher. Thank you very much!
Any way, I also see potential for future collaboration between Whonix and Tails for extending the usefulness of anon-connection-wizard beyond what Tor Launcher (and its replacement) offers [2];
This can be a really good point! If you don't mind, I would like to quote your idea as the "future work" in my proposal.
anon-connection-wizard targets the OS, not just a single application, so it could integrate the choices of network configuration (wired? which wireless network? MAC spoofing?)
I agree with you that:
"save these settings so they are restored the next time you visit the same network. This could potentially even be used to help giving users control over entry node selection to avoid persistent Entry Guards from leaking information about you geographical movement."
However, I am not sure if integrating the system-network-setting-related configuration(like MAC spoofing) in anon-connection-wizard will be a good idea in terms of a low coupling design. I am probably wrong but I personally prefer considering the anon-connection-wizard only as an graphical application to configure Tor, specifically, to configure torrc file.
Could you please share your insights about how we should define the anon-conncetion-wizard please? I am really looking forward to hearing your thoughts.
and Tor configuration (proxy? pluggable transport?) in a single place which probably makes more sense for users
Yes! Let's brainstorm more about the [torrc-related setting](https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en) at least! How about the FascistFirewall setting?! Users who are not really live in Tor-censored area should avoid using Tor Bridges for better anonymity.
Cheers!
[1] The first two scripts are parts of the build process, the two latter ones are for starting it: * https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-hooks/06-a
dduser_tor-launcher?h=devel
* https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-hooks/10-tbb ?h=devel
https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-includes/u
sr/local/sbin/tails-tor-launcher?h=devel
* https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-includes/usr /local/bin/tor-launcher?h=devel
[2] https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/network_connection/ [3] We discuss the issue of https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/
Thank you so much for your helpful sources. I will look at them in detail soon!
Please let me say thank you again for your feedback, anonym! I really appreciate your help! I have revised my proposal with the help of your feedback and I am going to send it to tor-dev mailing list in a seperate email! Please look forward to it!