On 12/13/14 1:33 AM, Vlad Tsyrklevich wrote:
I've attached a patch to warn bridge operators running with ORPort set to 443 or 9001 as a stop-gap measure.
IMHO the real point is that Tor, is not employing the techniques that used since decades by the COMSEC solutions in the radio-frequency, that is "frequency hopping".
On the internet we have TCP ports, on the radio-spectrum we have frequency.
Just apply the various, multiple, available, well documented techniques used to provide additional L1/L2 safety to the radio-frequency transmission techniques to Tor, et voilà, Tor would acquire important resiliency properties against massive scanning.
That's just a concept and approach, it would require a bit more of research, but i'm quite confident that would provide very important benefit compared to the minor performance issues introduced.