I would argue that the existence of this longer policy discussion, with no obvious solution, is why it behoves us to separate policy (as much as possible) from Tor's core mechanism.
-V On Wed, 6 Jan 2016 at 21:42 Peter Tonoli peter+tor@metaverse.org wrote:
Quoting Tim Wilson-Brown - teor teor2345@gmail.com:
If we ensure that Exits must pass some encrypted traffic, then running an Exit is less attractive to an adversary.
I'd argue that it's marginally less attractive. They still have the opportunity to inspect some unencrypted traffic.
And even adversaries contribute useful, secure bandwidth to the Tor
Network.
This could also potentially backfire: adversaries can create local (non-tor) policies to throttle encrypted exit traffic, while not throttling unencrypted traffic.
Peter..
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