On 29 Sep 2015, at 09:39, Jeff Burdges <burdges@gnunet.org> wrote:

The issue I do see is that SPV validation doesn't work well unless
you
ask multiple peers to make sure that you're getting the chain with
the
most PoW.  So I gather that this would require connecting to Namecoin
peers running on multiple exit nodes.  I don't think that's
problematic, but it would have to be taken into account.

This is no different from validation for existing DNS results.  Tor
attempts to prevent this by building a list of bad exits, but it's
challenging to catch an exit that attacks only one website.

You could check multiple peers but that costs you some anonymity.  If
you use many .bit names, this might expose the fact that you use
Namecoin to your guard.

How do you anticipate this exposure happening? Via traffic correlation?

As far as I understand, your guard only sees your encrypted traffic, and not your exit(s) or your DNS queries.

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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teor at blah dot im
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