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On 30/05/15 16:44, Nick Mathewson wrote:
On Fri, May 29, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Karsten Loesing karsten@torproject.org wrote:
router euler [scrubbed] 8000 0 0 identity-ed25519 -----BEGIN ED25519 CERT----- [scrubbed] -----END ED25519 CERT-----
Base64-decode that block, throw it into SHA256(), base64-encode the result, format as block. But wouldn't the result be much shorter? There's no new "fingerprint" equivalent, like "fingerprint-ed25519", is there?
Oh dear. That blob is a certificate, not a key. It changes over time, because the key that it certifies varies over time.
The format is documented in section 2.1 of proposal 220; the actual identity key is in an extension labeled with type 04 (see section 2.2.1).
Maybe we should add a fingerprint-ed25519 line? It would be redundant, but maybe valuable. What do you think?
I took a quick look at proposal 220, but not to the point that makes me entirely certain about this ed25519 stuff. If anything below remains unclear, that might be because I'm not clear about it myself. Please question everything I'm saying, even more than usual.
Let's also include Damian on this thread. He usually has good ideas about descriptors, and he knows about sanitizing bridge descriptors. And let's add Isis who is working a lot with bridge descriptors, too. (There may be more people we should ask, but hey, it's tor-dev@.)
So, I think a "fingerprint-ed25519" line would be useful. It would make the bridge descriptor sanitizing process much easier. It would also facilitate debugging network problems, because people can just grep descriptors rather than using specialized tools that know how to decode the cert. And with microdescriptors in place it should be okay to add this line even if it's redundant information, because clients would never download it.
If the server descriptor in #16227 were a bridge descriptor, I'd do the following steps for sanitizing it:
- Remove identity-ed25519 line and subsequent crypto block. - Keep yet-to-be-added fingerprint-ed25519 line, but SHA256 its value. - Keep extra-info digest line, but SHA1 and SHA256 its values. - Remove onion-key line and subsequent crypto block. - Remove signing-key line and subsequent crypto block. - Remove onion-key-crosscert line and subsequent crypto block. - Remove ntor-onion-key-crosscert line and subsequent crypto block. - Keep ntor-onion-key line, mostly because we didn't remove it so far; unless it should be removed? - Remove router-sig-ed25519 line. - Remove router-signature line and subsequent crypto block. - Add router-digest line with SHA1 of SHA1 of descriptor content and SHA256 of SHA256 of descriptor content; the rationale is that we don't have to write entirely new digests into the network status in order to match "r" lines with descriptors.
I also added the extra-info descriptor that corresponds to the server descriptor to #16227:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16227#comment:5
I wonder, what's the best way for including the ed25519 identity in the extra-info descriptor? How about extending the first line to:
"extra-info Truie SHA1-of-RSA SHA256-of-ed25519"
Possible downsides are that this additional value might break existing code and that it might be problematic to get rid of the SHA1-of-RSA part later. But the same issues would come up with the "extra-info-digest" line in server descriptors, and maybe there are good solutions.
Otherwise, a separate "fingerprint-ed25519" line might work here, too.
In order to sanitize such an extra-info descriptor, I'd do these steps:
- Keep extra-info line, but SHA1 (and possibly SHA256) its value(s). - Or, keep yet-to-be-added fingerprint-ed25519 line, but SHA256 its value. - Remove router-sig-ed25519 line. - Remove router-signature line and subsequent crypto block. - Add router-digest line with SHA1 of SHA1 of descriptor content and SHA256 of SHA256 of descriptor content; same rationale as above, but with the "extra-info-digest" line in server descriptors.
What do you think?
All the best, Karsten