On 2 Dec 2017, at 04:56, Fernando Fernández Mancera ffernandezmancera@gmail.com wrote:
If everybody chooses different amounts of data, that makes them easier to identify.
This reason is why it is not recommended to change the default value, same as for the MaxCircuitDirtiness parameter, so I will specify it on the proposal.
If a Tor option has a default value, and we don't recommend changing it, we try to remove that option. So we are unlikely to accept a patch for a new option unless there is some compelling use case for a group of users to set it differently.
Otherwise, we would accept code to set a default and keep that default.
Onion services may be a use case for this option, because if too much data gets sent through a single circuit, it makes it easy to identify the service's guard. (Of course, this only protects the service if the next circuit uses a different guard, which is not guaranteed.)
Alternately, Tor Browser may be a use case for this option, if it wants to manage its circuits itself, regardless of the amount of data they send.
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