On Mon, Apr 03, 2017 at 04:40:52PM +0100, Alec Muffett wrote:
On 3 Apr 2017 3:48 p.m., "Ian Goldberg" iang@cs.uwaterloo.ca wrote:
The other thing to remember is that didn't we already say that
facebookgbiyeqv3ebtjnlntwyvjoa2n7rvpnnaryd4a.onion
and
face-book-gbiy-eqv3-ebtj-nlnt-wyvj-oa2n-7rvp-nnar-yd4a.onion
will mean the same thing? So we're already past the "one (st)ring to rule them all" point?
That's a great point, and I'm definitely interested and in favour of readability.
How about this, though: I know that Tor doesn't want to be in the business of site reputation, but what if (eg) Protonmail offers a Onion "Safe Browsing" extension some day, of known-bad Onions for malware reasons?
That's a quite good motivating example, thanks!
There's quite a gulf between stripping hyphens from a candidate onion address and doing strcmp(), versus either drilling into the candidate address to compute the alternative forms to check against the blacklist, or even requiring the blacklist to be 8x larger?
Yes, that's true. I'm definitely in favour of the "multiply by L (the order of the group) and check that you get the identity element; error with 'malformed address' if you don't" to get rid of the torsion point problem.
If the daily descriptor uploaded to the point Hash(onionaddr, dailyrand) contained Hash(onionaddr, dailyrand) *in* it (and is signed by the master onion privkey, of course), then tor could/should check that it reached that location through the "right" onion address.
I'm afraid the details of what's in that daily descriptor are not in my brain at the moment. Does it contain its own (daily blinded) name under the signature?
- Ian