Re: [tor-dev] On the visualization of OONI bridge reachability data

On 24/10/14 01:53, isis wrote:

isis transcribed 6.6K bytes:

...

• The hashed fingerprint (as is the case for bridges in onionoo)
• The hashed ip:port

Actually, my apologies, I was quite tired when I wrote this and totally completely wrong.

A hashed ip:port would be a terrible idea because IPv4 space is only 2^32 and ports are 2^16. In total that's a 2^48 message space. Hashing for a preimage to get the bridge addresses in quite feasible in those constaints, as well as precomputing the attack offline.

We should come up with a different way to hide ip:ports.

I'm lacking context, but just in case this is even remotely relevant, here's how CollecTor sanitizes bridge IP addresses:

https://collector.torproject.org/formats.html#bridge-descriptors

All the best, Karsten