Yes, that's precisely the point - if the card is stolen, the service is stolen with it. I'm not trying to prevent that, I'm trying to _tie_ the service to the card - whoever has the card runs the service. If you see that the card is gone, you know your service is gone too. If the card is still there, your service keys are safe.

Razvan

On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 10:59 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 3:05 PM, Ivan Markin <twim@riseup.net> wrote:
> No, I will be secure. An adversary could sniff your PIN and sign
> whatever they want to, true. But revealing the PIN != revealing the key.
> In this case your identity key is still safe even if your PIN is
> "compromised".

Yes the private key may be safe, but the smartcard may be stolen or
removed from your sphere of access and reutilized with the sniffed
pin, thus your onion or relay or node is no longer under your control,
which was the point of the project. The enablement of the smartcard
needs to be out of band, or use some strong one way challenge
response like pki/totp/hotp/skey/opie.

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