4 May
2015
4 May
'15
1:10 p.m.
On Sat, May 02, 2015 at 08:37:17PM -0700, coderman wrote:
a friend and i are working on a Tor router design that doesn't compromise anonymity for convenience. [0][1][2][3][4]
So, unlike a transparent tor router, this system is not intended to prevent malicious software on client computers from being able to learn the client computer's location, right? An attacker who has compromised some client software just needs to control a single relay in the consensus, and they'll be allowed to connect to it directly?
It is unclear to me what exactly this kind of tor router *is* supposed to protect against. (I haven't read the whole document yet but I read a few sections including Threat Model and I'm confused.)
~leif