Thanks George - that is where the discussion is happening. Unfortunately, public participation is really limited in the CAB Forum. However, if you want to help, please reach out to the individuals advocating against the proposal (or submit your suggestions to me) to see if we can get a secure, but useful, process adopted.
-----Original Message----- From: tor-dev [mailto:tor-dev-bounces@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of George Kadianakis Sent: Tuesday, November 18, 2014 10:55 AM To: tor-dev@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs
Tom Ritter tom@ritter.vg writes:
There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so that's where I'm going to start, and then at each item maybe talk a little bit about how to get there. So I think the Tor Project and Tor Browser should:
a) Eliminate self-signed certificate errors when browsing https:// on an onion site b) Consider how Mixed Content should interact with .onion browsing c) Get .onion IANA reserved d) Address the problems that Facebook is/was concerned about when deploying a .onion e) Consider how EV treatment could be used to improve poor .onion readability
Thanks for all the thoughts Tom!
This is hard topic and I don't really have strong opinions on this.
Some notes:
- Allowing self-signed certs sounds like a potentially good idea to me. However, I can hear grarpamp's concerns and it's not obviously clear to me that it's something we should do.
In general, the whole user education part of this is quite hard to evaluate, and I don't think I understand the problem well enough to take a stance.
- In general, having CAs sign onion certificates seems like a good thing for now. There are threat models that would really benefit from this, so we should make it a possibility and work with CAs to get the best out of it.
- I'm not very afraid of CA certificates getting out of control, that is the community evolving to a point that if an HS doesn't have a CA certificate it's not considered secure.
This doesn't seem like something that will happen any time soon, and if it ever happens and we really want to stop it, well it's good we have a Firefox fork ;)
Personally, I would let this issue develop organically:
In the short-term future, we should help CAs make their certs useful for the onionspace, and we should also make some trac tickets and plans for any Tor modifications we want to do (for example, trusting self-signed certs signed by the HS identity key seem like a generally good idea).
I encourage anyone with good ideas and opinions to get involved with the CA community and help them make this useful. As I understand it, part of the discussion is happening here: https://cabforum.org/pipermail/public/2014-November/004569.html
_______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev