On Fri, Jun 07, 2013 at 02:23:55AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
This has the side effect of promoting good onion upkeep.
Which people might be loathe to do given the recent paper about deanon hidden services seeming to be relatively doable. At least until those issues are solved...
of the system. After 6 months (or so) the naming will stabilize and be (mostly) consistent month-to-month, but how do we guarantee that a
...not if people are replacing their network address every month.
This shouldn't be a problem if the service id (onion address) remains the same across IP address changes. If the HS is stable then, as far as I understand this system, it should maintain its name.
I know very little about eepsites, but as long as the guarantees provided by eepsites and HS are equivalent regarding security and anonymity, this is an interesting idea. The easiest/obvious way to accomplish this is to have gateways/peering-points between the two networks ... Unless, are you talking about running I2P and Tor on the same computer/network and being able use the same naming scheme to connect to both eepSites and Hidden Services?
One such obvious scheme that exists today is your host simply routing packets out its tunnel interfaces resident on respective Tor / I2P / Phantom IPv6 address space to some such services.
Then anything, or set of things with unique addressing amongst them, can have some petname layer on top.
Sure
malicious actor is not able to register popular internet domains (torproject, ddg, etc) before the legitimate/honest actor?
Really? Lol. You're not going to solve that even if you recreate the non-anonymous internet. Petname strings in an anonymous censor free system have no gatekeepers. As with the internet, users will set up, choose, and duke it out in their own DNS for that if they want it... on top of the provided secure network addressing.
Even being able to put/maintain *any* name out there will be hard.
Right, which is why I'm not sure a centralized naming system will work in this environment. 1) The user loses the self-authentication of the service (whether or not they understood they had it in the first place). 2) It's not possible to guarantee a name maps to the same hidden service over long periods (see 1.) and if trust in placed in the name then this is important. If I visit https://google.com I expect not to be MITMd and I expect to receive a reply from Google Inc's webserver.