On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the IP addresses used by the exit are not even in the same /8.
It would be nice to prevent different IP traffic for Exit, unless OutBoundBindAddress is defined and/or OutBoundExitAddress (ie:https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17975) is implemented and defined.
From a "transparency" point of view, i think that any routing aspects
shall stay into the consensus database, so that it could be checked for possible sign of manipulations.
If someone want to do asymmetric routing, then that information must be in the consensus (IMHO).