Tom Ritter:
On 28 May 2013 14:51, adrelanos adrelanos@riseup.net wrote:
How good are SSH connections with hiding what's inside?
Website fingerprinting has demonstrated, that SSH connections may hide communication contents, but which website was visited, could be guessed with a fairly good results.
Tor isn't a website, but if SSH leaks which website has been visited even when using a SSH tunnel, will it also leak the fact, that someone is using Tor through a SSH tunnel?
I think that if we make the adversary upgrade from probing and byte matching (e.g. look for specific ciphersuites) to statistical protocol modeling, especially with a small time investment on our part, we have won a battle. Development effort isn't free.
You probably can detect Tor traffic inside of SSH with some probability X after some amount of traffic Y. But what X, what Y, and how much effort on behalf of the adversary will it take? I don't know, but I do think we should work to move the fight beyond something as simple as byte matching.
Yes. Don't let me put off this idea. It was just a wild guess. Most likely an ssh transport will always work for a few people and that already an improvements. The more pluggable transports, the better. Maybe if there are enough transports, the other side just gives up.