Hi,
since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
Note: I'm _not_ suggesting to use DOH in torbrowser I'm just asking because the answer probably matters for exit documentation in the relay guide if clients do DNS themselves over TCP connections instead of relying on the exit (even if torbrowser is not the only tor client).
thanks, nusenu
[0] https://www.ghacks.net/2018/03/20/firefox-dns-over-https-and-a-worrying-shie... [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hoffman-dns-over-https/
Hi,
On 20 May 2018, at 02:39, nusenu nusenu-lists@riseup.net wrote:
since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
Note: I'm _not_ suggesting to use DOH in torbrowser I'm just asking because the answer probably matters for exit documentation in the relay guide if clients do DNS themselves over TCP connections instead of relying on the exit (even if torbrowser is not the only tor client).
thanks, nusenu
[0] https://www.ghacks.net/2018/03/20/firefox-dns-over-https-and-a-worrying-shie... [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hoffman-dns-over-https/
The latest version of the spec is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https/
T
nusenu:
Hi,
since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
Actually, the study did not get done yet. The start date is scheduled for June 4th, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446404
We'll look at the code in the coming weeks when doing our audit for ESR60 and we'll follow the Mozilla experiment closely. Right now we don't have plans to enable DOH in Tor Browser 8.
Georg
Georg Koppen:
nusenu:
Hi,
since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
Actually, the study did not get done yet. The start date is scheduled for June 4th, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446404
We'll look at the code in the coming weeks when doing our audit for ESR60 and we'll follow the Mozilla experiment closely. Right now we don't have plans to enable DOH in Tor Browser 8.
Since we are discussing this topic in the "Support for full DNS resolution and DNSSEC validation" thread, I wanted ask whether there have been any updates on this topic since and how you think about making use of DoH in Tor Browser?
I'd be interested to write a design document, but if you see a blocker then we probably shouldn't be putting any resources into it.
kind regards, nusenu
On Sun, Jun 14, 2020 at 08:19:13PM +0200, nusenu wrote:
Georg Koppen:
nusenu:
Hi,
since Mozilla did tests [0] on DOH [1] in Firefox I was wondering if Torbrowser developers have put any thought into that as well?
Actually, the study did not get done yet. The start date is scheduled for June 4th, see: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1446404
We'll look at the code in the coming weeks when doing our audit for ESR60 and we'll follow the Mozilla experiment closely. Right now we don't have plans to enable DOH in Tor Browser 8.
Since we are discussing this topic in the "Support for full DNS resolution and DNSSEC validation" thread, I wanted ask whether there have been any updates on this topic since and how you think about making use of DoH in Tor Browser?
Sorry for the delay. The short answer is "we aren't planning on making any use of DoH in Tor Browser".
I'd be interested to write a design document, but if you see a blocker then we probably shouldn't be putting any resources into it.
The (slightly) longer answer is that, at face value, there are many seemingly obvious disadvantages to Tor Browser using DoH for DNS resolution and there aren't many advantages. I didn't follow the DNSSEC thread, but I just skimmed it, so I apologize if I reiterate some already mentioned points.
Using DoH has the same disadvantages as the tor client sending its own DNSSEC query (instead of letting the exit relay perform the resolution). I see Roger mentioned the concern about additional latency and round-trips, so I won't restate that.
Your comment about achieving hostname-confidentiality is interesting, but (as with most arguments about ESNI+DoH) this assumes/requires multi-tenant service providers (and centralization, in general). We can get a similar outcome by including a list of providers that support domain fronting and Tor Browser doing some intelligent substitution in the TLS handshake. This would be very hacky, though.
The main concern I have is that DoH is not fit for Tor's purposes. Instead of trying to re-use a new level of abstraction, we can get a lot of the same benefits by improve the adoption and usability of onion services.
With all of this being said, I am curious to see measurement results that compare connection times where a) the exit relay handles the DNS resolution, and b) where Tor Browser uses a DoH server and then requests a connection to a raw IP address.
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Georg Koppen -
Matthew Finkel -
nusenu -
teor