Greetings,
I'm attaching a proposal for adding authentication to the Extended ORPort. The Extended ORPort is a yet unimplemented feature, that allows pluggable transports proxies to communicate with Tor; it's a prerequisite for pluggable transport statistics, rate limiting, and other cool things.
Filename: XXX-ext-orport-auth.txt Title: Tor Extended ORPort Authentication Author: George Kadianakis Created: 28-11-2012 Status: Open Target: 0.2.5.x
1. Overview
This proposal defines a scheme for Tor components to authenticate to each other using a shared-secret.
2. Motivation
Proposal 196 introduced new ways for pluggable transport proxies to communicate with Tor. The communication happens using TCP in the same fashion that controllers speak to the ControlPort.
To defend against cross-protocol attacks [0] on the transport ports, we need to define an authentication scheme that will restrict passage to unknown clients.
Tor's ControlPort uses an authentication scheme called safe-cookie authentication [1]. Unfortunately, the design of the safe-cookie authentication was influenced by the protocol structure of the ControlPort and the need for backwards compatibility of the cookie-file and can't be easily reused in other use cases.
3. Goals
The general goal of Extended ORPort authentication is to authenticate the client based on a shared-secret that only authorized clients should know.
Furthermore, its implementation should be flexible and easy to reuse, so that it can be used as the authentication mechanism in front of future Tor helper ports (for example, in proposal 199).
Finally, the protocol is able to support multiple authentication schemes and each of them has different goals.
4. Protocol Specification
4.1. Initial handshake
When a client connects to the Extended ORPort, the server sends:
AuthTypes [variable] EndAuthTypes [1 octet]
Where,
+ AuthTypes are the authentication schemes that the server supports for this session. They are multiple concatenated 1-octet values that take values from 1 to 255. + EndAuthTypes is the special value 0.
The client reads the list of supported authentication schemes and replies with the one he prefers to use:
AuthType [1 octet]
Where,
+ AuthType is the authentication scheme that the client wants to use for this session. A valid authentication type takes values from 1 to 255. A value of 0 means that the client did not like the authentication types offered by the server.
If the client sent an AuthType of value 0, or an AuthType that the server does not support, the server MUST close the connection.
4.2. Authentication types
4.2.1 SAFE_COOKIE handshake
Authentication type 1 is called SAFE_COOKIE.
4.2.1.1. Motivation and goals
The SAFE_COOKIE scheme is pretty-much identical to the authentication scheme that was introduced for the ControlPort in proposal 193.
An additional goal of the SAFE_COOKIE authentication scheme (apart from the goals of section 2), is that it should not leak the contents of the cookie-file to untrusted parties.
Specifically, the SAFE_COOKIE protocol will never leak the actual contents of the file. Instead, it uses a challenge-response protocol (similar to the HTTP digest authentication of RFC2617) to ensure that both parties know the cookie without leaking it.
4.2.1.2. Cookie-file format
The format of the cookie-file is:
StaticHeader [32 octets] Cookie [32 octets]
Where, + StaticHeader is the following string: "! Extended ORPort Auth Cookie !\x0a" + Cookie is the shared-secret. During the SAFE_COOKIE protocol, the cookie is called CookieString.
Extended ORPort clients MUST make sure that the StaticHeader is present in the cookie file, before proceeding with the authentication protocol.
Details on how Tor locates the cookie file can be found in section 5 of proposal 196. Details on how transport proxies locate the cookie file can be found in pt-spec.txt.
4.2.1.3. Protocol specification
A client that performs the SAFE_COOKIE handshake begins by sending:
ClientNonce [32 octets]
Where, + ClientNonce is 32 octets of random data.
Then, the server replies with:
ServerHash [32 octets] ServerNonce [32 octets]
Where, + ServerHash is computed as: HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) + ServerNonce is 32 random octets.
Upon receiving that data, the client computers ServerHash herself and validates it against the ServerHash provided by the server.
If the server-provided ServerHash is invalid, the client MUST terminate the connection.
Otherwise the client replies with:
ClientHash [32 octets]
Where, + ClientHash is computed as: HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" | ClientNonce | ServerNonce)
Upon receiving that data, the server computers ClientHash herself and validates it against the ClientHash provided by the client.
Finally, the server replies with:
Status [1 octet]
Where, + Status is 1 if the authentication was successfull. If the authentication failed, Status is 0.
4.3. Post-authentication
After completing the Extended ORPort authentication successfully, the two parties should proceed with the Extended ORPort protocol on the same TCP connection.
[0]: http://archives.seul.org/or/announce/Sep-2007/msg00000.html
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/79f488c32c43562522e5592f2c199...
Ugh, forgot the Acknowledgments section in my previous mail. This proposal is identical to the previous one, but with acknowledgments included. Enjoy.
Filename: XXX-ext-orport-auth.txt Title: Tor Extended ORPort Authentication Author: George Kadianakis Created: 28-11-2012 Status: Open Target: 0.2.5.x
1. Overview
This proposal defines a scheme for Tor components to authenticate to each other using a shared-secret.
2. Motivation
Proposal 196 introduced new ways for pluggable transport proxies to communicate with Tor. The communication happens using TCP in the same fashion that controllers speak to the ControlPort.
To defend against cross-protocol attacks [0] on the transport ports, we need to define an authentication scheme that will restrict passage to unknown clients.
Tor's ControlPort uses an authentication scheme called safe-cookie authentication [1]. Unfortunately, the design of the safe-cookie authentication was influenced by the protocol structure of the ControlPort and the need for backwards compatibility of the cookie-file and can't be easily reused in other use cases.
3. Goals
The general goal of Extended ORPort authentication is to authenticate the client based on a shared-secret that only authorized clients should know.
Furthermore, its implementation should be flexible and easy to reuse, so that it can be used as the authentication mechanism in front of future Tor helper ports (for example, in proposal 199).
Finally, the protocol is able to support multiple authentication schemes and each of them has different goals.
4. Protocol Specification
4.1. Initial handshake
When a client connects to the Extended ORPort, the server sends:
AuthTypes [variable] EndAuthTypes [1 octet]
Where,
+ AuthTypes are the authentication schemes that the server supports for this session. They are multiple concatenated 1-octet values that take values from 1 to 255. + EndAuthTypes is the special value 0.
The client reads the list of supported authentication schemes and replies with the one he prefers to use:
AuthType [1 octet]
Where,
+ AuthType is the authentication scheme that the client wants to use for this session. A valid authentication type takes values from 1 to 255. A value of 0 means that the client did not like the authentication types offered by the server.
If the client sent an AuthType of value 0, or an AuthType that the server does not support, the server MUST close the connection.
4.2. Authentication types
4.2.1 SAFE_COOKIE handshake
Authentication type 1 is called SAFE_COOKIE.
4.2.1.1. Motivation and goals
The SAFE_COOKIE scheme is pretty-much identical to the authentication scheme that was introduced for the ControlPort in proposal 193.
An additional goal of the SAFE_COOKIE authentication scheme (apart from the goals of section 2), is that it should not leak the contents of the cookie-file to untrusted parties.
Specifically, the SAFE_COOKIE protocol will never leak the actual contents of the file. Instead, it uses a challenge-response protocol (similar to the HTTP digest authentication of RFC2617) to ensure that both parties know the cookie without leaking it.
4.2.1.2. Cookie-file format
The format of the cookie-file is:
StaticHeader [32 octets] Cookie [32 octets]
Where, + StaticHeader is the following string: "! Extended ORPort Auth Cookie !\x0a" + Cookie is the shared-secret. During the SAFE_COOKIE protocol, the cookie is called CookieString.
Extended ORPort clients MUST make sure that the StaticHeader is present in the cookie file, before proceeding with the authentication protocol.
Details on how Tor locates the cookie file can be found in section 5 of proposal 196. Details on how transport proxies locate the cookie file can be found in pt-spec.txt.
4.2.1.3. Protocol specification
A client that performs the SAFE_COOKIE handshake begins by sending:
ClientNonce [32 octets]
Where, + ClientNonce is 32 octets of random data.
Then, the server replies with:
ServerHash [32 octets] ServerNonce [32 octets]
Where, + ServerHash is computed as: HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, "ExtORPort authentication server-to-client hash" | ClientNonce | ServerNonce) + ServerNonce is 32 random octets.
Upon receiving that data, the client computers ServerHash herself and validates it against the ServerHash provided by the server.
If the server-provided ServerHash is invalid, the client MUST terminate the connection.
Otherwise the client replies with:
ClientHash [32 octets]
Where, + ClientHash is computed as: HMAC-SHA256(CookieString, "ExtORPort authentication client-to-server hash" | ClientNonce | ServerNonce)
Upon receiving that data, the server computers ClientHash herself and validates it against the ClientHash provided by the client.
Finally, the server replies with:
Status [1 octet]
Where, + Status is 1 if the authentication was successfull. If the authentication failed, Status is 0.
4.3. Post-authentication
After completing the Extended ORPort authentication successfully, the two parties should proceed with the Extended ORPort protocol on the same TCP connection.
5. Acknowledgments
Thanks to Robert Ransom for helping with the proposal and designing the original safe-cookie authentication scheme. Thanks to Nick Mathewson for advices and reviews of the proposal.
[0]: http://archives.seul.org/or/announce/Sep-2007/msg00000.html
[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/blob/79f488c32c43562522e5592f2c199...
-
George Kadianakis -
Nick Mathewson