I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the IP addresses used by the exit are not even in the same /8.
Also, there are several groups of exits whose OR addresses *are* in a related subnet, but which all exit through the same, unrelated, IP address. See for example 109.236.82.* (all exiting through 185.108.128.7), 178.17.171.* (all exiting through 37.48.65.71), and 217.23.11.* (all exiting through 85.17.31.120) in the table below.
I wrote an exitmap module that hits an IP-checker website. The module wrote a CSV file where each row included the exit's OR address and the address as reported by the remote web site. I ignored IPv6 OR addresses. I did not find any fingerprint that had more than one IPv4 address (considering the .fingerprint and .or_addresses members from Stem). Percentages are just raw counts, not weighted by exit probability.
Total number of exits: 1018 (100.0%) Number of failures: 18 (1.8%) Number of matches: 891 (87.5%) Total number of mismatches: 109 (10.7%) Number of 1-octet mismatches: 19 (1.9%) Number of 2-octet mismatches: 3 (0.3%) Number of 3-octet mismatches: 0 (0.0%) Number of 4-octet mismatches: 87 (8.5%)
Table of mismatches * = mismatch 1 octet ** = mismatch 2 octets *** = mismatch 3 octets **** = mismatch 4 octets fingerprint or_address remote_address mark B060482C784788B8A564DECD904E14CB305C8B38 176.10.104.241 176.10.104.240 * DC41244B158D1420C98C66F7B5E569C09DCE98FE 176.10.104.241 176.10.104.240 * 487092BA36F4675F2312AA09AC0393D85DAD6145 176.10.104.244 176.10.104.243 * DE7DE889E0D1A5F397AE35642060B84999581203 176.10.104.244 176.10.104.243 * 7A65CC8F45134F3393A0295EFFD2980DD885E8E2 176.123.6.157 176.123.6.155 * A7E78D9880BB0793409D386D15E83B3B1236B19F 178.175.128.54 178.175.128.50 * 8BF22BEA5F854F2BB2E09C71260ADF590D355E36 213.61.149.125 213.61.149.100 * 80D73E75A30BEEF627604B7014753304764E0723 213.61.149.126 213.61.149.100 * 5D263037FC175596B3A344132B0B755EB8FB1D1C 31.185.27.203 31.185.27.1 * C974508A98446F36169FB248655BCD50DF17F14C 37.130.227.134 37.130.227.133 * 170EC06D58E9094A027F4169514ADD98D30983A6 46.235.226.27 46.235.226.226 * D3BE73ECE50DA9243DC0DF9DA6ED25027B82D385 50.7.178.101 50.7.178.100 * FEDEF82551BB49DB54BE6C77D27AD0E20A8D6FD6 50.7.178.102 50.7.178.100 * 10E13E340651D0EF66B4DEBF610B3C0981168107 77.247.181.164 77.247.181.162 * 06E123865C590189B3181114F23F0F13A7BC0E69 77.247.181.166 77.247.181.162 * 664BDC0344771122FC6C4F577BF0AEC3F4ED5456 80.73.242.142 80.73.242.130 * 9E3E47D7B92144CBAB0D487CCE192531F6A55833 81.209.35.111 81.209.35.112 * 410C286061266C562049178C6BF1E04060F51F7C 94.103.175.85 94.103.175.86 * F4B72EA6FD0EACF652B6C200611F37244F2B31F3 94.242.228.107 94.242.228.108 * 62BEE61EB88D4A81C3BA3931D6FA999D706AC4D5 62.149.13.57 62.149.12.153 ** 1BC17B72F90998F0BAEE25E36FFC140C9D7A8D7A 85.119.82.4 85.119.84.57 ** AA60D088E8317BBA3D2CF96C706AB4452FB2F57D 90.182.128.100 90.182.235.46 ** 4E915A5CCDBBDD4BD4B7F09A5AFB581AB1AD7EF2 107.181.178.204 104.156.228.72 **** 03B4386E579BEBCF7605D0FB17A688B35C342D5D 109.236.82.50 185.108.128.7 **** C3B1E12BCA2F307B64737AB84993E7B414FD3D09 109.236.82.50 185.108.128.7 **** B9DC592CBC10EC7428730BF658F9211B8773800F 109.236.82.51 185.108.128.7 **** DE89B3B6954FFC0F76F6B37A05E2AD6EF3B046F1 109.236.82.51 185.108.128.7 **** CF9F5B88C0F95EB6C5547CE5FB38503049DF784D 109.236.82.52 185.108.128.7 **** 57275A9356CFB1D36E64B117D44AB9F67711E483 109.236.82.53 185.108.128.7 **** D1E52741A7DCB4D51C7EFC82A654E2527516E1B0 109.236.82.53 185.108.128.7 **** 7837F5B740223D19D8A0D3127D2A8EB9FDA59F67 148.163.73.112 206.217.208.162 **** B6045286F21E7078203E1B03C8E00669A2154724 148.163.73.112 206.217.208.162 **** D225C2EC81E044E3947BC49929E46003ED62C89F 151.80.164.147 46.166.186.238 **** 23A69F271ACBFACB20467559D1C04F13DEF74B4B 153.92.126.135 128.127.105.94 **** 4236DF494DC91E1245234AA676F1F993ECB067F5 153.92.126.135 128.127.105.94 **** 27CE487BABE6C2128FB2D1A801C7CB715B48EC6B 153.92.126.19 168.1.6.34 **** C369EB6BFDFB996864746944544B82C9684C46EA 153.92.126.19 168.1.6.34 **** 5453CAF677B8E754C4D5EFA1FEDD8ABB16950FCB 153.92.127.143 168.1.10.226 **** 756F68024C6E55FF7142AD933C135F88B552A932 153.92.127.143 168.1.10.226 **** B0E7C83FA0C728997BB60CB0C758A3A3FDC3C1DB 173.243.112.148 162.216.46.165 **** E6BE2BEAAF4A543F9D94CD20CB459ECFEA3AD1B1 173.243.112.148 162.216.46.165 **** 7585DDCEB14783C69960E777BA258F5B3948F1C9 176.126.85.175 159.122.133.198 **** CBBCD92AD9479C8FBB8AA17FF22C7EC206FF5B1A 176.126.85.175 159.122.133.198 **** 9634A0F1FBE02EBF6E0D59CA7835928D6D55CBCA 176.126.85.176 161.202.72.152 **** C68988E3DD72549AD9C3D1A67FAD056241154775 176.126.85.176 161.202.72.152 **** 58287449DDAD3CF4020071E1139CB4A22BB02D02 178.17.171.140 37.48.65.71 **** 7E2AFD5EA1FD32B0EBA4BDC3C102B9DC67B882E7 178.17.171.140 37.48.65.71 **** 59DE28A0D0A5529CEA9FC4B90DFCFCEC980C4139 178.17.171.156 37.48.65.71 **** E94FA1FDEDF7FC10208C51DABD4EC5045C0A4EC4 178.17.171.156 37.48.65.71 **** 52F6510B5D59678B77DF351C0F7F9B5A2070F393 178.17.171.157 37.48.65.71 **** A566EBAC657485F3D0AEE70C021EA2658D9F0B09 178.17.171.157 37.48.65.71 **** BCF9B6FA788E7F74DD77724D205C46195688D748 178.17.171.159 37.48.65.71 **** D41C2006D7C461BDC22B9D236CC93F5D366C1388 178.17.171.159 37.48.65.71 **** 5CECC5C30ACC4B3DE462792323967087CC53D947 178.32.181.96 37.187.129.166 **** 65F9944338C684109EB975D0EC7489B30E191E87 178.32.181.97 37.187.129.166 **** 66AA1EB64AAFEDC1EA8E49A701F6C472102C5E1A 178.32.181.98 37.187.129.166 **** 4F0003EAB0E8712B94B29A84BF8B8F34C95927BC 185.106.120.153 216.185.103.139 **** 4287D0C57CEFBE7E06B24A0E9370DC671FED5462 185.62.190.38 93.115.87.78 **** D96F409E59D5C41F3761F1F23438131BDE57C538 185.62.190.38 93.115.87.78 **** 8E15D869D266DF5B08351122185F9660CA6D0FA2 185.82.202.178 216.185.103.139 **** BF6379111EC2C29C104ED0239D5709D08BC3B9EB 188.209.52.109 5.149.249.10 **** 184E9215A97F21323BF8661329FCB6F89305CDAC 192.3.24.227 173.225.119.156 **** 9AC41D1DCA4A1BB5D52708E9EE00CED129567B7C 192.3.24.227 173.225.119.156 **** 7DF1BD29A7F927B61F31688395D39F75FC541647 209.141.43.84 67.212.234.181 **** 86D3FECC084BE5611B3F7F4791DAB6204C2E2996 209.141.43.84 67.212.234.181 **** 5F2F5B0014BE0C36E98EEAD5FC35A100FCCEDD4B 217.23.11.95 85.17.31.120 **** CC8C96DF58EFC67662FF751425D2A4D6C7D0F8F0 217.23.11.95 85.17.31.120 **** 1BE59B741F6DAECF29F13226C33B3282316BD81C 217.23.11.97 85.17.31.120 **** 83FCB9E1BE894C3947686AB6C11074B4AAA959B7 217.23.11.97 85.17.31.120 **** AB802EDBD1CF49CDE5A03394AC1B20C5DC1E17CE 217.23.11.98 85.17.31.120 **** C8D9AD239C658121999E56196A8AF74FF586A073 217.23.11.98 85.17.31.120 **** A478E6F4F193BDE43C3BD2BC6A5BC90DA5472FE8 217.23.7.25 168.1.99.217 **** B3233E96418C4E89AF22FC9A1F2392C0D194117B 217.23.7.25 168.1.99.217 **** 4AF6CEC4351DE02BB5A7CBBC82607171832C687B 217.23.7.79 168.1.99.217 **** 26ABA62FBEE9A751790C31AA9EE9E5014439769C 217.23.7.98 168.1.99.217 **** 382248E9E99857109B14344CF2B88166B41297A3 217.23.7.98 168.1.99.217 **** 137AEDE28D9E0BBABE2A5B2F476096740EF1A226 217.23.7.99 168.1.99.217 **** 69ABCEEE7117BBBBF74BA03C09963D28A4F7376F 217.23.7.99 168.1.99.217 **** FA4E22CFC0802D6738837DE980AFC7199F7DB040 217.34.135.225 136.0.2.226 **** 68F70BFCB2A5400ED6F98C8DB30C41A36743962D 217.37.19.115 95.211.184.197 **** C9A7289A94FF30C8772D7E70B56EACA330B95D08 31.220.42.170 95.211.148.154 **** D8082DFB5E22F23D60DE1F6A80986323FF86C027 31.220.42.170 95.211.148.154 **** D90ED0B491FB089EEA827188891BB47EBE13DC14 37.48.124.116 85.17.31.120 **** 276A7ACA7515E90ABB2AB36D4F3421B1C7FB4501 37.48.124.117 85.17.31.120 **** 5FEA88EFEDC5897F7094A1759CE25BA0D3DA87E7 37.48.124.117 85.17.31.120 **** 1F85C11528B6C599EDC488A68DF045F73D29CB18 37.48.64.48 109.201.143.40 **** F712F85AFA84A4D68A40A7AC20416D0B426969CD 37.48.64.48 109.201.143.40 **** 0C7A04579C0A53D99389333D2F9BAE35589F0F84 37.48.64.49 109.201.143.40 **** 71AE6B66F521BD5E6F304A08FB2ABADF4557D815 37.48.64.49 109.201.143.40 **** B9C49DBE93D7D70B41CF95C4F91EFDFC73FC5E60 46.105.183.141 108.61.123.75 **** D3DA6122AA416B8D7AB02CA9858DC3F206C656D2 46.105.183.142 108.61.123.75 **** D85E3FFE70BCBC6964969CDF1065457736D99DE4 50.7.124.238 161.202.72.185 **** 1AE0B173A9FA95D4258B9FC181FDB2BBF040F913 50.7.124.243 161.202.72.185 **** C5325DED0CFEA73F381920FADF5F1220B72841B8 50.7.124.243 161.202.72.185 **** 68D9005982673F068B7844D60915FD141155A8AC 51.254.83.238 108.61.123.75 **** 7774C0F736E02AD48C7A4F3BDFE636A21BBE0255 51.254.83.238 108.61.123.75 **** 4F154FF308400D5BDFB791FAD4C7577547BAA5CA 74.122.198.101 168.1.6.28 **** C75EC9CB9667CEC47BB155DD322789DBE0384ED8 74.122.198.101 168.1.6.28 **** 308D5B726051761D40DB31C7E89254A3CD3F27E0 78.142.19.59 85.17.25.22 **** 3D28E5FBD0C670C004E59D6CFDE7305BC8948FA8 78.142.19.59 85.17.25.22 **** 70119F72F2609BA1CC12640BF66905FE21768152 79.143.87.204 104.238.169.126 **** 83D664A8216DBE4BD48F71BDC61E8F7D8AB68517 79.143.87.204 104.238.169.126 **** C7E75D7D968C2355791EC29A420F69AF2737DA58 93.158.215.174 31.7.56.133 **** 0FAE6840763B2C9DDBCDD9DBA7C1A0549FF0155A 94.242.206.183 93.115.83.253 **** 13DFA359319F34F3FFC55154BDBC499FB5822C1C 94.242.206.183 93.115.83.253 **** 0760C0A34CCBCB2614075E27B88151FCC7D047EC 94.242.206.35 93.115.83.253 **** BFD74D651690324DCA9FB744E2D54DDC814DD3FB 94.242.206.35 93.115.83.253 **** 0BE8EBA01005974782C4573037F4F82D915166C5 96.43.142.28 80.82.215.199 **** A9FEB4AD16FC0ECCF5B01885374E4243E0981384 96.43.142.28 80.82.215.199 ****
On 01/11/2016 06:43 PM, David Fifield wrote:
Also, there are several groups of exits whose OR addresses *are* in a related subnet, but which all exit through the same, unrelated, IP address. See for example 109.236.82.* (all exiting through 185.108.128.7), 178.17.171.* (all exiting through 37.48.65.71), and 217.23.11.* (all exiting through 85.17.31.120) in the table below.
This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I guess they have their reasons. Maybe those are part of a traffic analysis setup, who knows.
As have probably concluded from your table, Tor directory authorities allow up to two Tor nodes per IP address.
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 12:44 AM, Jesse V kernelcorn@riseup.net wrote:
This is quite interesting, thanks for the report. I'm not sure why it would be advantageous to set up a server or network this way, but I guess they have their reasons.
1) They may or may not be aware of their routing, or the routing applied to them. 2) Having this feature in the network doesn't break anything, except for maybe check.torproject.org, and a handful of clearnet sites that attempt and often fail to redirect you to their onion, no big deal, hit the new circuit button and try again. 3) Having this feature in the network greatly enhances Tor user's ability to select an exit and get around silly Tor blocks that rely on various consensus, RBL, DNS, whatever lists. Whether it's censorship of the source or destination, it's still censorship. And getting around censorship is one key features and critical use cases of Tor.
There is no specification that says exits must exit from their OR IP, or any other IP. I seriously don't know why people continue to get their panties in a bunch over this. Please stop. Nice stats though.
cc tt tr because relavance
On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the IP addresses used by the exit are not even in the same /8.
It would be nice to prevent different IP traffic for Exit, unless OutBoundBindAddress is defined and/or OutBoundExitAddress (ie:https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17975) is implemented and defined.
From a "transparency" point of view, i think that any routing aspects
shall stay into the consensus database, so that it could be checked for possible sign of manipulations.
If someone want to do asymmetric routing, then that information must be in the consensus (IMHO).
On 12 Jan 2016, at 21:01, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists lists@infosecurity.ch wrote:
On 1/12/16 4:43 AM, David Fifield wrote:
I wanted to know how many exits exit from an address that is different from their OR address. The answer is about 10.7%, 109/1018 exits. The interesting part is that of those 109 mismatches, 87 have an exit address that differs from the OR address in all four octets; i.e., the IP addresses used by the exit are not even in the same /8.
It would be nice to prevent different IP traffic for Exit, unless OutBoundBindAddress is defined and/or OutBoundExitAddress (ie:https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17975) is implemented and defined.
The current tor implementation simply calls connect() if OutBoundBindAddress is not set for the destination address family. This means that the connection will be made from a source address based on the routing table entry for the destination address. Tor really doesn't have much control over this, it's an OS-level decision.
We could set the default value of OutboundBindAddress(es) to the ORPort address(es), but this would override the OS's routing tables. I'm not sure this is a great idea on multi-homed hosts, as routing tables are typically set up for good reasons, and it would surprise operators to have them overridden. There would also be no way to switch this default off, and simply use the OS routing tables.
In other environments, the routing may be done at the VPS or ISP level, at which point tor can't even detect it without asking a (potentially unreliable) remote host.
Of course, if the operator specifically configures an outbound address, or an outbound address for Exit traffic (#17975), that's a different matter - tor should obey explicit configuration directives.
From a "transparency" point of view, i think that any routing aspects shall stay into the consensus database, so that it could be checked for possible sign of manipulations.
If someone want to do asymmetric routing, then that information must be in the consensus (IMHO).
I'm not sure that adding "exit" IP addresses to the consensus is that helpful, given that: * multi-homed hosts may have different exit IPs for different destinations or address families, and * tor may not be able to detect which address(es) it is exiting from, or it may be an expensive or unreliable process.
But please feel free to submit a proposal to include exit IP addresses in the consensus - it would help if it included strategies to address these concerns.
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
teor2345 at gmail dot com PGP 968F094B
teor at blah dot im OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F
On 1/12/16, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor teor2345@gmail.com wrote:
... The current tor implementation simply calls connect() if OutBoundBindAddress is not set for the destination address family. This means that the connection will be made from a source address based on the routing table entry for the destination address. Tor really doesn't have much control over this, it's an OS-level decision.
per https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17975 however, it might make sense to have a specific bind address for Exit traffic, in addition to a general OutBoundBindAddress for OR-links. (as you allude to below)
We could set the default value of OutboundBindAddress(es) to the ORPort address(es), but this would override the OS's routing tables.
do NOT set a default for OutboundBindAddress ! it is intended as an override, since the default behavior is usually desired and should be kept as is.
Of course, if the operator specifically configures an outbound address, or an outbound address for Exit traffic (#17975), that's a different matter - tor should obey explicit configuration directives.
this is the proper situation. only question is who would have a compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound Exit traffic, as per #17975?
I'm not sure that adding "exit" IP addresses to the consensus is that helpful, ...
do NOT ask for exit IP in consensus. it is not useful, not accurate, wastes bandwidth, and fails in its intended purpose.
best regards,
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:58 AM, coderman coderman@gmail.com wrote:
this is the proper situation. only question is who would have a compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
On 1/13/16, grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 9:58 AM, coderman coderman@gmail.com wrote:
... only question is who would have a compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
have you ever set this up for a Tor relay? really?
i've done plenty of networking on multi-homed systems and run relays many years, yet never had to go beyond existing behavior with the outbound bind address. Exit binding as distinct option might be useful, yet no one has defined a reasonable scenario for such utility.
best regards,
On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 4:27 AM, coderman coderman@gmail.com wrote:
... only question is who would have a compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
outbound bind address. Exit binding as distinct option might be useful, yet no one has defined a reasonable scenario for such utility.
another reason could be separating the exitIP as sacrificial on abuse complaint and/or set in a freeforall dmz, where orIP may more neutral and/or long term.
don't know if anyone has deployed on any of these potential reasons.
In our quantifications of relay diversity, knowing the IP addresses that traffic exits from is important. Ways to have this information correctly reported would be very helpful.
-V On Thu, 14 Jan 2016 at 03:01 grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com wrote:
On Wed, Jan 13, 2016 at 4:27 AM, coderman coderman@gmail.com wrote:
... only question is who would have a compelling use for separating outbound OR connections and outbound Exit traffic, as per #17975?
Bandwidth peering contracts preferential to push or eyeball traffic.
outbound bind address. Exit binding as distinct option might be useful, yet no one has defined a reasonable scenario for such utility.
another reason could be separating the exitIP as sacrificial on abuse complaint and/or set in a freeforall dmz, where orIP may more neutral and/or long term.
don't know if anyone has deployed on any of these potential reasons. _______________________________________________ tor-dev mailing list tor-dev@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
On 1/14/16, Virgil Griffith i@virgil.gr wrote:
In our quantifications of relay diversity, knowing the IP addresses that traffic exits from is important. Ways to have this information correctly reported would be very helpful.
i want to be very clear: asking relays to report their public exit IPs in censensus this way is both misguided and wasteful.
misguided because it won't work as you expect, the right way to check is to build circuits and see where they exit from. you can do this yourself!
and wasteful because this is extra information in an already too large consensus not necessary for or useful to building circuits for Tor users to achieve privacy.
don't do it! (unless there is a compelling reason, which i have yet to hear.)
best regards,
On Sun, Jan 17, 2016 at 01:01:03PM +0100, coderman wrote:
misguided because it won't work as you expect, the right way to check is to build circuits and see where they exit from. you can do this yourself!
Tor Project already does it for you with archived data and everything: https://collector.torproject.org/#exit-lists "The exit list service TorDNSEL publishes exit lists containing the IP addresses of relays that it found when exiting through them."
rgds,
On Sun, Jan 17, 2016 at 10:24:47PM +0000, cacahuatl wrote:
On Sun, Jan 17, 2016 at 01:01:03PM +0100, coderman wrote:
misguided because it won't work as you expect, the right way to check is to build circuits and see where they exit from. you can do this yourself!
Tor Project already does it for you with archived data and everything: https://collector.torproject.org/#exit-lists "The exit list service TorDNSEL publishes exit lists containing the IP addresses of relays that it found when exiting through them."
Oh, wow, thanks. I did not know that TorDNSEL was already providing this service. Combined with https://collector.torproject.org/#type-network-status-consensus-3 it should be possible to do what I did with my exitmap scan for any time in the past.
-
cacahuatl -
coderman -
David Fifield -
Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) - lists -
grarpamp -
Jesse V -
Tim Wilson-Brown - teor -
Virgil Griffith