Tor hidden service operators: your default Apache install is probably vulnerable

TL;DR  If you run a Tor hidden service for an Apache server, make sure you disable mod_status with:  $ a2dismod status

On most distributions, Apache ships with a handy feature called mod_status enabled. It's a page located at /server-status that displays some statistics, like uptime, resource usage, total traffic, enabled virtual hosts, and active HTTP requests. For security reasons, it's only accessible from localhost by default.

This seems fairly reasonable, until you realize the Tor daemon runs on localhost. Consequently, any hidden service using Apache's default config has /server-status exposed to the world. What could a malicious actor do in that case? They could spy on potentially sensitive requests. They could deduce the server's approximate longitude if the timezone is set. They could even determine its IP address if a clearnet Virtual Host is present.

But this shouldn't be too much of a problem. Surely people who have taken the time to install an advanced web server and configure a hidden service for it have thoroughly read the documentation and disabled the offending module.

Or not.