Considering how closely we work with Mozilla I suspect this program is
no surprise, but none the less forwarding it along since it could very
well benefit some of our sub-projects.
Cheers! -Damian
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Slashdot: manishs <atagar2(a)gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 7:45 AM
Subject: Mozilla Will Fund Code Audits For Open Source Software
To: atagar1(a)gmail.com
Reader Orome1 writes: The Mozilla Foundation has set up the Secure
Open Source (SOS) Fund, whose aim is to help open source software
projects get rid their code of vulnerabilities. Projects that want
Mozilla's help must be open source/free software and must be actively
maintained, but they have a much better probability to being chosen if
their software is commonly used and is vital to the continued
functioning of the Internet or the Web. Three open source projects --
PCRE, libjpeg-turbo, and phpMyAdmin -- have already gone through the
process, and the result was removal of 43 vulnerabilities (including
one critical).
[![](https://a.fsdn.com/sd/twitter_icon_large.png)](http://twitter.com/home?status=Mozilla+Will+Fund+Code+Audits+For+Open+Source+Software%3A+http%3A%2F%2Fbit.ly%2F25PgTSg)
[![](https://a.fsdn.com/sd/facebook_icon_large.png)](http://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fnews.slashdot.org%2Fstory%2F16%2F06%2F10%2F1418216%2Fmozilla-will-fund-code-audits-for-open-source-software%3Futm_source%3Dslashdot%26utm_medium%3Dfacebook)
[![Share on Google+](http://www.gstatic.com/images/icons/gplus-16.png)](http://plus.goo…
[Read more of this
story](https://news.slashdot.org/story/16/06/10/1418216/mozilla-will-fund-c…
at Slashdot.
![](http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/Slashdot/slashdot/~4/VLQ1G2rQYWM)
URL: http://rss.slashdot.org/~r/Slashdot/slashdot/~3/VLQ1G2rQYWM/mozilla-will-fu…
Hello gentle people!
I am looking over the machines that tor is paying for, and two of them
are the 1984 machine that we have labelled only as crm and
ubuntu1404lts-persona. I think they may have been created at one point
by Andrew.
Does anybody know who might be using these machines?
If you have an idea, please let us know.
If one of them is your machine, or at one point was, please let us know
if it is still useful and we should keep it around. (And please briefly
describe what it is being used for.)
If I don't hear anything, and nobody objects either, I will stop having
them auto-renewed, i.e., I will decommission them.
Thanks.
--
| .''`. ** Debian **
Peter Palfrader | : :' : The universal
https://www.palfrader.org/ | `. `' Operating System
| `- https://www.debian.org/
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
See this posting for context:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/2016-April/000223.html
Notes for June 2 2016 meeting:
Alison:
1) status of community documents
2) still working on SIDA proposal with Isa
Mike:
1) Postponed my vacation for another week or so to help with community
issues. I'll be quietly working on my phone prototype in the meantime.
2) Will be attending a panel on the Decentralized Web next week. Then
maybe vacation? Unclear.
Shari:
1) Erin the new HR person starts on Monday, so I'll need help from
various folks to get her set up.
2) Board meeting recap.
Nick:
1) Changed addresses on many online accounts. Make sure everybody in
the office knows how not to get phished.
Karsten:
1) Released DescripTor 1.2.0 containing a complete rewrite of docs
into Javadocs.
2) Finished metrics proposal together with Cass, Isabela, iwakeh, and
Shari.
Kate:
1) It's important that Tor people talking to the media about Tor touch
base with me prior to interviews so that I can help them with media
training (if needed), discuss the reporter with them, etc. I need to
understand which reporters are covering which topics. This is an
evergreen request and also a longstanding policy.
Georg:
1) Tor Browser 6.0 is out \o/
Isabela:
1) network team - working on next release [make it smaller]
2) OTF - reply to their questions [also pinged Sue on invoices we
should be doing will ping her again is $ to come in ;)]
3) DRL- preparing F-indicators and extension letter
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Comment: GPGTools - http://gpgtools.org
iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJXVrBAAAoJEC3ESO/4X7XBFpsH/2Olfmnra7LFD4rjQ0rW5SK6
mexUJK+BuDagpIRj/96rZyWZAYXrVSND3p4ECMf/elOZqdZrZ04CNkrxyMRRIZBU
m5Wl+T/pyJxowPv9nE7jgmkwM+156ZfMkJmqKC6NK9j52BY14C05p8Ni5c3IfPbg
kjW8kNKx9apBnxbA+dhnTq9rHzNbvEDzNc1FhowVr1nsxHOevQwl+SPHdluJ5PoA
PyP4Ux/qKtm0chumd1NPxh9I1WvZXXUdq2UwfWcfez3dWmepl+WCEy6mGRdpJ9TF
bMlHKpaCN6xh0MC8fGGYX+WjDFHAjPHyW7gO+15NOTFVl7DSLUk3NUGkuW3Mh5Q=
=/6x0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Someone pointed out the Hewlett Foundation grants to me:
http://hewlett.org/blog/posts/refining-our-cyber-initiative-grantmaking-str…http://hewlett.org/sites/default/files/Cyber%20Initative%20Refined%20Grantm…
It does not seem that they have 'open' grant applications, but they
fund in the hundreds-of-thousands of dollars range to orgs like
Berkman, New America, CDT, and a bunch of universities - so it seems
worthwhile to think about and see if Tor could put in a proposal...?
The goals for their grants are:
- Building Capacity of Civil Society Orgs
- Building Capacity of Individual Decision-Makers and Influencers
- Building a Robust Network of Cybersecurity Experts
- Generating Policy Driven Research and Thought Leadership
- Cofunding
It's not a slam dunk for the main sort of work Tor does, but it seems
like it may fit OONI quite well or could be a vehicle for sponsorship
of devs to attend things like Open Web Summits.
-tom
Lynn Tsai and I, with the help of others, have been measuring how long
it takes for Tor Browser's default bridges to be blocked.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.08808 (click "PDF")
Abstract:
Censors of the Internet must continually discover and block new
circumvention proxy servers. We seek to understand the pace of
this process, specifically, the length of the delay between when
a proxy becomes potentially discoverable and when the censor
blocks it. We measure this delay by testing the reachability of
previously unseen Tor bridges, before and after their
introduction into Tor Browser, from sites in the U.S., China,
and Iran, over a period of five months. We find that China's
national firewall blocks these new bridges, but only after a
varying delay of between 2 and 18 days, and that blocking occurs
only after a user-ready software release, despite bridges being
available earlier in source code. While the firewall notices new
bridges in Tor Browser, bridges that appear only in Orbot, a
version of Tor for mobile devices, remain unblocked. This work
highlights the fact that censors can behave in unintuitive ways,
which presents difficulties for threat modeling but also
opportunities for evasion.
The best summaries are on pages 4 and 5, which show in graphical/tabular
form the dates of releases and how long the bridges remained reachable
after. We would appreciate any comments or corrections. In particular,
the description of the Tor Browser release process could stand some
fact-checking by a Tor Browser developer.