As some of you have already noticed, a security issue regarding the Yubikey 5 series has been released two days ago. Sadly, the Yubikeys distributed at the 2023 Tor Meeting in Costa Rica are affected.
### The issue at hand
To work their magic, Yubikeys store a secret key inside them that is never supposed to leave the device. Researches at Ninjalab found out that by physically probing one of the chips inside a Yubikey, it is possible to acquire this secret key. Once an adversary has acquired such a secret key, they can use this to perform two-factor authentication and/or OpenPGP operations, as if they were the owner of the device.
In practice, abusing this vulnerability is quite costly. It requires:
- having physical access to your Yubikey - knowing a password(s) to one of your accounts protected by two-factor authentication (and/or your PIN if you use passkey) to get to your two-factor secret key - knowing your PIN to get to your OpenPGP secret key
Nevertheless, it's not unthinkable that adversaries with sufficient resources may be targeting Torproject.
### Am I affected?
- Was the Yubikey you use given to you in Costa Rica? Then yes, you are affected. - Are you using a Yubikey 5 that was purchased before May this year? Then yes, you are affected. - Are you using a Yubikey 5 that was purchased after May this year? Then you should check the firmware version to see if you are affected. Keys with firmware prior to 5.7 are affected.
For instructions on how to find out which firmware your Key has, see the [Where to find YubiKey Firmware][] guide from Yubico. Command-line users can use the `ykman info` command to view the firmware version.
[Where to find YubiKey Firmware]: https://support.yubico.com/hc/en-us/articles/12420838928284-Where-to-find-Yu...
### What does this mean for me?
The impact for you depends on what you use your Yubikey for.
#### For two-factor authentication
If you use your Yubikey for two-factor authentication, this attack can be used on top of a regular phishing attack to permanently break the second factor and compromise your accounts, without you noticing.
#### For OpenPGP signing and decryption
If you use your Yubikey for OpenPGP signing or authentication, you should check what type of key you have:
- If it's an RSA key, you are not affected by this vulnerability. - If it's an elliptic curve key, and the attacker knows your PIN, this attack can be used to gain access to and make a copy of your secret key. An attacker could then forge signatures, authenticate to servers, or possibly decrypt other secrets.
### What should I do?
First of all, in the wise words of Douglas Adams: don't panic.
We advise you to take care of the following:
- Keep using your Yubikey for two-factor authentication, it is still much safer than TOTP (e.g., google authenticator) or not having any two-factor authentication.
- Do make sure you don't leave your Yubikey unattended, especially during conferences, in hotel rooms, etc.
- Avoid using passkey (passwordless authentication).
- Apply multi-coloured glitter nail polish on the casing of your Yubikey (yes, really) and store a photo of it. If you have reason to believe the device has been tampered with, check if the glitter is still the same.
- If you use your Yubikey for OpenPGP and have an elliptic curve key, please ensure you have a strong PIN. You may consider switching to an RSA key or switching to a newer Yubikey using firmware 5.7 or higher, depending on the impact a compromise of your key may have.
### References
- YubiCo advisory YSA-2024-03: https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2024-03/ - Technical paper: https://ninjalab.io/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/20240903_eucleak.pdf .
### Further questions
If you have any questions about the safety of your Yubikey, please feel free to contact TPA, see:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/tpa/team/-/wikis/support