Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
Thanks! --Roger
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 05:32:24AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
I am so totally not a lawyer, but
Suppose I post a comment somewhere, say a news site or blog that accepts comments, and I don't identify my location (district) in that comment. Suppose the site allows unauthenticated comments (alternatively, the site has a posted privacy policy to protect my facebook/gmail/ whatever-they-use login credentials except for that use and permits me to choose any available username, ---alternatively alternatively, I use my regular longstanding gmail address overtly as identifier for the post, but don't announce my district in any way and I have never authorized Google to use or reveal my location to others.)
If I say anything in that comment that any magistrate judge anywhere in the country can be convinced indicates there is on my computer evidence of any crime whatsoever in his district (or a crime such that activites related to it have occurred in his district), then is it the case that that judge can issue a warrant to seize my computer? (And in the alternative scenarios above, could they then issue a warrant (subpoena?) for Google to turn over records of where I logged into my gmail from?)
aloha, Paul
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 09:55:38PM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 05:32:24AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
I am so totally not a lawyer, but
Suppose I post a comment somewhere, say a news site or blog that accepts comments, and I don't identify my location (district) in that comment. Suppose the site allows unauthenticated comments (alternatively, the site has a posted privacy policy to protect my facebook/gmail/ whatever-they-use login credentials except for that use and permits me to choose any available username, ---alternatively alternatively, I use my regular longstanding gmail address overtly as identifier for the post, but don't announce my district in any way and I have never authorized Google to use or reveal my location to others.)
If I say anything in that comment that any magistrate judge anywhere in the country can be convinced indicates there is on my computer evidence of any crime whatsoever in his district (or a crime such that activites related to it have occurred in his district), then is it the case that that judge can issue a warrant to seize my computer? (And in the alternative scenarios above, could they then issue a warrant (subpoena?) for Google to turn over records of where I logged into my gmail from?)
For some other examples, see https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/archive/docs/Rule41botnettestim...
There it is noted that probably any victim of a widescale botnet could have their computer seized under Rule 41 changes. Also examples are given of people merely sharing servers or service providers being so affected. Also how seizure has included and could include in that case interception and re-routing of traffic besides the potential for hardware seizure.
aloha, Paul
Roger:
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 05:32:24AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
This is exactly what public policy is. I am enthused that Roger is enthused that we should work on this.
I would say that job #1 is not to call the Senate but our allies.
More tomorrow,
Katie--
ps: Paul--very good question that I think requires an actual attorney, or someone at the ACLU.
Kate Krauss Director of Communications and Public Policy kate@torproject.org @TorProject 1-718-864-6647 (works for Signal also) PGP: CC0D 9B42 DE89 D4D0 619B A606 DDEB 3937 7D18 973B
On May 4, 2016, at 8:39 PM, Kate Krauss kate@torproject.org wrote:
Roger:
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 05:32:24AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
This is exactly what public policy is. I am enthused that Roger is enthused that we should work on this.
I would say that job #1 is not to call the Senate but our allies.
I agree, with the caveat that we should be offering to do the trainings Roger describes. That’s a great way we can contribute to the fight that takes advantage of our unique expertise. Our allies can introduce us to Senator Wyden and others. Shari
More tomorrow,
Katie--
ps: Paul--very good question that I think requires an actual attorney, or someone at the ACLU.
Kate Krauss Director of Communications and Public Policy kate@torproject.org @TorProject 1-718-864-6647 (works for Signal also) PGP: CC0D 9B42 DE89 D4D0 619B A606 DDEB 3937 7D18 973B
tor-project mailing list tor-project@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-project
Shari Steele:
On May 4, 2016, at 8:39 PM, Kate Krauss kate@torproject.org wrote:
Roger:
On Wed, May 04, 2016 at 05:32:24AM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Hi Alison, Kate,
Check out https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/supreme-court-gives-fbi-more-hacking-pow...
I think this is a really important outreach topic.
A) We should reach out to the senators who are planning to fight the changes, to offer to teach them more about Tor and more about the Internet, see if they have any questions or concerns, etc. I bet there are some staffers somewhere who are working on exactly this topic, and everything they know about Tor they learned from one scary video about the dark web. We should teach them how Tor works, why people need it, and why a diversity of types of users is key to its security.
B) At the same time, we should learn what their talking points are, so we can be better at educating people about the issue. In particular, one of the quotes in the article says it's "possibly the broadest expansion of extraterritorial surveillance power since the FBI's inception", but at the same time, I can totally picture people saying "Oh come on, it's just Tor, how can that be such a big change?" We would be smart to have concrete non-Tor examples of what these new powers would allow, so everybody can understand that these changes aren't just about Tor.
This is exactly what public policy is. I am enthused that Roger is enthused that we should work on this.
I would say that job #1 is not to call the Senate but our allies.
I agree, with the caveat that we should be offering to do the trainings Roger describes. That’s a great way we can contribute to the fight that takes advantage of our unique expertise. Our allies can introduce us to Senator Wyden and others. Shari
Sounds great, and +1 to Katie's comment about doing this super important public policy work. Here's what I'm thinking:
-I don't know which allies Katie has in mind to contact but I'm happy to help with that task. I assume that DC policy types that are already in front of this would be key, like Access? -I can really easily come up with a training program that would get at all the key points -- all the privacy software affected by this with a special focus on Tor. We'd just have to decide who we want to invite, where we can host it, etc. And to that end... -One place we could contact is DC Public Library. They held a weeklong program of privacy events last year called Orwellian America, and we've been talking about doing an LFP training there, so we already know them. Might be a good space to host something like this. -As for lawmakers to contact when we're ready to do that, Nima and I have a good relationship with Zoe Lofgren's office. We can contact other folks who voted for Massey-Lofgren, and of course anyone who is coming out against this bill.
Lemme know how we wanna proceed!
Alison
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