Hi!
I've also noticed suddenly 3-5x more bridge users using the one I run with
a concrete difference in Russian connections highly increased in number of
unique users compared as the others countries which are looking stable.
(Sorry for my bad English, I hope it was comprehensible enough)
Have a nice week!
Nils
Le lun. 6 déc. 2021 à 13:00, <tor-relays-request(a)lists.torproject.org> a
écrit :
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> Today's Topics:
>
> 1. Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available (Vin?cius Zavam)
> 2. Is Tor Actually "Blocked" In Russia, or Are Some Users
> Unblocked for now? (Neel Chauhan)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2021 19:30:38 +0000
> From: Vin?cius Zavam <egypcio(a)googlemail.com>
> To: undisclosed-recipients:;
> Subject: [tor-relays] Snowflake's package for FreeBSD available
> Message-ID:
> <
> CA+Kr6DNtCC6-iQ7Et71UyTkqArcB_ruO4CcY8nMUm278BJaeyg(a)mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> ol?! :)
> agora temos um pacote para instalar Snowflake em FreeBSD. aproveitem!
>
> tl;dr; we now have a package to install Snowflake on FreeBSD. enjoy!
>
> since the 14th of Nov 2021 we have a port that builds a Snowflake package
> that can be installed on FreeBSD. it gives us all 3 different
> features/functions that we can use Snowflake for:
>
> - client
> - proxy
> - server
>
> don't know Snowflake yet?
>
> - https://snowflake.torproject.org/
> - https://community.torproject.org/relay/setup/snowflake/
> -
>
> https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snow…
>
> if you are using the "latest" branch of pkg, try it out! the package is
> called "snowflake-tor"
>
> # pkg update -f
> # pkg install -U snowflake-tor
>
> wanna checkout the source of its port?
>
> -
>
> https://cgit.freebsd.org/ports/commit/?id=057c0c3c0645c0b237bb2a96dda440e04…
>
> did you know about the "Run a Bridge" campaign?
>
> - https://blog.torproject.org/run-a-bridge-campaign/
>
> that's it! stay safe and have a great one
> obrigado ]=)
>
>
> --
> Vin?cius Zavam
> keybase.io/egypcio
>
Hello everyone!
Some of you might have noticed that there is a visible drop of relays on
our consensus-health website.[1] The reason for that is that we kicked
roughly 600 non-exit relays out of the network yesterday. In fact, only
a small fraction of them had the guard flag, so the vast majority were
middle-only relays. We don't have any evidence that these relays were
doing any attack, but there are attacks possible which relays could
perform from the middle position. Therefore, we decided we'd remove
those relays for our users' safety sake.
While we were already tracking some of the relays for a while, a big
chunk of them was also independently reported by a cypherpunk and nusenu
helped analyzing the data. Thanks to both of them from our side.
Foe what it is worth: a large part of those relays did not set any valid
contact info and/or when we tried to contact some of the relays'
operators the emails bounced. However, we sometimes need to have ways to
reach relay operators, be it for debugging purposes or for helping them
with relay misconfiguration. Thus, please set a valid contact info when
running relays.
Finally, anyone running relays: try to get connected to the community so
we can build some trust among each other. That seems to be an essential
part in our long-term strategy to fight bad relays trying to enter our
network.
Georg
[1] https://consensus-health.torproject.org/graphs
Hello!
Relays running unsupported Tor versions is a problem we have never
really dealt with in a systematic way in the way. Some of you might
recall that we (with the help of volunteers) tried back in 2019/2020 to
get operators, running an unsupported Tor version, to upgrade[1] but
then we dropped the ball. Alas.
We just started that process again by contacting every relay operator
running an outdated Tor version (any version not 0.3.5.x or 0.4.5.x or
0.4.6.x or 0.4.7.x) by email where possible. Additionally, we created a
wiki page outlining the current process and things we still need to
figure out.[2] On that page we plan to make statistics related to the
EOL relay removal available as well, including the final list of relays
we'll reject. Thus, stay tuned. Feedback, as always, is very much welcome!
We plan to keep this topic on our radar this time while refining the
process as we go. Meanwhile, if you are running a relay with an
unsupported Tor version, please upgrade for the sake of our users' safety.
If you need help, join us on #tor-relays or #tor-relays:matrix.org if
you use Element.
Thanks,
Georg
[1] https://blog.torproject.org/removing-end-life-relays-network
[2]
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/network-health/team/-/wikis/Relay-EOL-pol…