From my point of view its much more helpful to run an DoH (or DNSCrypt,
DoT if you like) client on an exit and randomly distribute requests to a set of DoH/DNSCrypt/DoT-Servers to hide the actual DNS Requests an exit is doing from an adversary which might use this information for correlation.
As the requests are randomly distributed between a set of servers this additionally fixes the problems of a single entity answering/monitoring all DNS requests.
Unfortunately root servers doesn't support encrypted DNS (except of openNIC but I dont think they are not an option for a general recommendation because only 9 servers are currently supporting encryption).
BUT: By using for example the list of encrypting dns servers and dnscrypt-proxy the dnscrypt project is offering it would be easy to implement a huge set of relays using a random set of DoH or DNSCrypt enabled dns servers.
Regards,
flux
On 3/5/20 3:45 PM, Alec Muffett wrote:
On Thu, 5 Mar 2020 at 14:37, Iain Learmonth <irl@torproject.org mailto:irl@torproject.org> wrote:
On 05/03/2020 14:20,Nathaniel Suchy wrote: > It’s not a threat model issue. Who gets to see Tor users DNS requests is exactly a threat model issue.Concur. That is exactly the reason that I am asking clarification of Nathaniel's perspective, here.
I'm currently doing some research on the area, and am particularly interested in which/all of Nathaniel is concerned by:
1/ blocking of Tor-users' DNS requests 2/ tampering with Tor-user's DNS requests 3/ surveillance of Tor-users' DNS requests 4/ *corporate* surveillance of Tor-users' DNS requests 5/ other...
Because if Nathaniel is primarily interested in 3 and 4 from that list, then this is a particularly interesting video to watch (cued up to 0:33 for convenience)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FrGZczZ8tyU&t=0m33s
...and which, with a little reflection regarding the "anonymity loves company" philosophy of Tor, suggests that the solution might in part be MORE AND PRIVATE use of "big" resolvers... because the little ones are just as much, perhaps more of a risk.
-a
-- http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
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