On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 3:54 AM, Virgil Griffith i@virgil.gr wrote:
good locations...
intelligence prioritizes spying on Tor relays they will simply download the list and tap the desired relays, regardless of where the relay is topographically located.
There may be situations in which tapping at a particular vantage point will capture most traffic of many relays, such that resources tapping each one of them is unnecessary, even if there is some loss in visibility due to the tap necessarily being some distance from all of the relays thus missing some traffic traversing them on the side.
maximize censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in the middle (lots of interconnections) that do not currently have Tor relays.
Yes, assuming they're well connected to censoring AS's and censored users.
I think I'm retracting this as gibberish train of thought. At the IP / dpi level, censored is censored, not much getting around it, you either get out to your remote guard, or your local guard gets out to the next hop, or you don't.
Though the well connectedness could help performance such as latency by possibly having fewer hops and policies appear between any two relays.
And diversity seeking that do not go too far out to the edges so as to affect performance. I've yet to lookup the central AS's but I'm guessing they'll all be major transit. And the edge ones will be small ISP's / regionals.
There may be point in locating at the edges that prefer peer with each other, so as to avoid potentially easier aggregate tapping at the core. Though finding those relationships in order to weave those paths is hard.
Reference some other posts I made about traffic arcs across the globe and minimum RTT.