For adversaries such as an authoritarian government. They have the capability to port scan every host on the internet and then try to connect with Tor Protocol to every port and then block suspected bridges automatically. The Chinese government could easily tell China Unicom to let us send traffic across all of your IP Ranges at random and they would have to comply. If this is your threat model a Private OBFS4Proxy Bridge (not published in BridgeDB and blocking the ORPort (only allow the OBFS4 Port) might be a better solution for you :)
Cordially, Nathaniel Suchy
Dec 4, 2018, 8:43 AM by charlyghislain@gmail.com:
If it wasn't, would posting the ip address of a client connecting to a bridge in here compromise her anonymity and/or allow one to firewall/blacklist her traffic? Im assuming one could guess the ip address of the running bridge based on the poster email address.
On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 2:57 PM <> tschador@posteo.de mailto:tschador@posteo.de> > wrote:
On 2018-12-04 13:15, George wrote:
tschador@posteo.de mailto:tschador@posteo.de>> :
I wonder who is permanently connecting/checking(?) my Tor bridge relay.
That's the bridge directory authority.
Ok, thank you. _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list
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