I suspect that Telmex ISP, Mexico biggest by far, found a very surgical way to prevent relays.

Atlas only show a small group of Mexican relays, all of them in other ISP.

Tor client (and I2P) works well, and the hidden services too. Pluggable transports and/or the tor alpha make easy to bypass this little nuance.

Usually Telmex ISP does not implement any kind of wide censorship, is generally pretty open. I think this a very smart attack to tor infrastructure, it does not prevent tor in general, but almost all the exit traffic will go to outside the country, and little traffic will mix between Mexican tor clients that choose having a relay.

For me, I will try to make stone arguments for a little David/Goliath action, because Telmex works like "that is not a problem if others are not complaining" , "Facebook is working, right?"

On Thu, Feb 18, 2016 at 4:47 AM, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor <teor2345@gmail.com> wrote:

On 18 Feb 2016, at 14:40, Ricardo Malagon Jerez <rjmalagon@gmail.com> wrote:

I don't know how and why, but since January is impossible to have an exit relay in Telmex ISP.
And is harder to reach authority nodes.
Someone wrote about this, but is mid February and is the same.
Tor 2.8 alpha works pretty good with the authority fallback measures, but I can't implement the exit relay or publish the relay.

Thanks for the feedback about the fallback directory mirrors feature - I am glad to hear that it's working as planned.
But it only works for clients.

Relays need to be able to post their descriptors to the authorities. So they have to be able to reach at least one authority - they can't use only fallback directory mirrors.

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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