grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com wrote:
The advantages for tor users against censorship, of operators making some fraction of all exit nodes exit from different addresses than those addresses present in consensus, have been explained many times on this list.
There are also advantages for tor users in keeping the hosts on which relays run secured against attacks, which helps to keep the tor network functioning. Having connections arrive from addresses not associable with tor relays by the recipients of those connections hinders connectivity among relays in the consensus, as has been explained many times on this list. I call attention to the fact that the tor project has already decided against Exit node secrecy by regularly publishing the results of a script (exitmap) that reveals such addresses.
It's also been noted that in at least one instance, some exit operators looking at constrained / creative hosting issues have chosen that as an enabling option too.
However, the tor project has publicly promised to identify publicly all Exit source addresses, so that system administrators everywhere who wish to block tor Exits to their networks may do so without blocking all tor relays. The readily downloadable exitmap results allegedly fulfill that promise. Are you now alleging that, in at least one instance, the tor project has surreptitiously broken its promise by omitting that instance's address(es) from the exitmap file?
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *xor* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************