Hello,
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence.
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
[0]: http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201... [1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket
On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000 isis isis@torproject.org wrote:
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence.
Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601...
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure out how to make it work.
Thanks, Alexander --- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000 isis isis@torproject.org wrote:
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence.
Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601...
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
-- Yawning Angel
[0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it, and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman" and not "apt-get".
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256
If you want to try to install jessi without updating your system it's possible. Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list, run apt-get update. Then use this and only this command to upgrade only that package from new repository (check if you need to replace jessie with unstable or something like that):
apt-get -t jessie install name of your package
You don't need to remove repository from your sources list because this command will lock upgrades of other packages. Check this url for more info: https://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences, in section "Installing from unstable".
On 3 February 2015 at 18:33, Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote:
Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure out how to make it work.
Thanks, Alexander
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000 isis isis@torproject.org wrote:
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence.
Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as
possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators
of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
tools/Week-of-Mon-20150202/001119.html [1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket
All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/ f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601473e85e8226
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
-- Yawning Angel
[0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it, and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman" and not "apt-get".
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
The problem with "Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list" is that this will not work on Ubuntu without GPG errors, since the keys used for signing the packages are unknown. And the Debian developers don't seem to publish their key fingerprints on their website.
The second problem is that the next "aptitude safe-upgrade" wants to "update" a ton of packages, presumably from Debian Testing. I did read the page on pinning, but just couldn't figure out how to make this work on Ubuntu.
So it's probably safer to wait for obfs4proxy to show up in Ubuntu repositories. Is there already a plan for that?
Best regards,
Alexander
--- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-05 21:17, ZEROF wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256
If you want to try to install jessi without updating your system it's possible. Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list, run apt-get update. Then use this and only this command to upgrade only that package from new repository (check if you need to replace jessie with unstable or something like that):
apt-get -t jessie install name of your package
You don't need to remove repository from your sources list because this command will lock upgrades of other packages. Check this url for more info: https://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences [1], in section "Installing from unstable".
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On 3 February 2015 at 18:33, Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote: Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure out how to make it work.
Thanks, Alexander
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp [3] | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000 isis isis@torproject.org wrote: I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence. Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs. More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
[0]: http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201... [4] [1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket [5] All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601... [6]
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
-- Yawning Angel
[0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it, and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman" and not "apt-get". _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [7]
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [7]
--
http://www.backbox.org [8] http://www.pentester.iz.rs [9]
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [7]
Links: ------ [1] https://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences [2] http://openpgpjs.org [3] https://dietrich.cx/pgp [4] http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201... [5] https://github.com/yawning/basket [6] https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601... [7] https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays [8] http://www.backbox.org [9] http://www.pentester.iz.rs
You can pin package/repository priority. You just have to create a file in /etc/apt/preferences.d/ with contents like
Package: * Pin: release o=jessie Pin-priority: 400
then run apt-get update and apt-cache policy PACKAGE to confirm your settings.
On Sat, Feb 14, 2015 at 12:50 PM, Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote:
The problem with "Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list" is that this will not work on Ubuntu without GPG errors, since the keys used for signing the packages are unknown. And the Debian developers don't seem to publish their key fingerprints on their website.
The second problem is that the next "aptitude safe-upgrade" wants to "update" a ton of packages, presumably from Debian Testing. I did read the page on pinning, but just couldn't figure out how to make this work on Ubuntu.
So it's probably safer to wait for obfs4proxy to show up in Ubuntu repositories. Is there already a plan for that?
Best regards,
Alexander
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-05 21:17, ZEROF wrote:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256
If you want to try to install jessi without updating your system it's possible. Add repositry to /etc/apt/sources.list, run apt-get update. Then use this and only this command to upgrade only that package from new repository (check if you need to replace jessie with unstable or something like that):
apt-get -t jessie install name of your package
You don't need to remove repository from your sources list because this command will lock upgrades of other packages. Check this url for more info: https://wiki.debian.org/AptPreferences, in section "Installing from unstable".
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On 3 February 2015 at 18:33, Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote:
Is it possible to install the obfs4proxy package securely (with signature verification) on Ubuntu? I looked at this a while ago, but couldn't figure out how to make it work.
Thanks, Alexander
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-03 01:14, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Mon, 2 Feb 2015 22:41:40 +0000 isis isis@torproject.org wrote:
I requested that the obfs4proxy package in Debian jessie be ported to wheezy-backports, [0] however, it seems this is extremely unlikely to happen because it would mean backporting pretty much every Golang package in existence.
Last I heard, that was mostly unnecessary, though how exactly this apt pinning stuff works is a mystery to me[0].
I would be super stoked if we could make it as easy and seamless as
possible for the Bridge operators who are still running obfs2 (!!) to move to supporting better, newer Pluggable Transports. Currently recommended PTs to run are: obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, and fteproxy. When Tor Browser 4.5 becomes stable (probably in mid-April 2015), we'll want lots more obfs4 Bridges! For the super adventurous sysadmins who'd like to try Yawning's experimental new post-quantum PT, Basket [1] is one of the newest PTs.
More obfs4 bridges would be amazing. It's worth noting that obfs4proxy can also handle obfs2 and 3 (and with a branch that I need to test/merge soon, a ScrambleSuit client), and it even is easy to run bridges on ports < 1024 without messing with port forwarding.
Basket is still a research project and non-researchers shouldn't deploy it because the wire format may change (and it consumes a hilarious amount of bandwidth).
We should probably come up with some easy instructions for operators
of Tor Bridge relays who are running Debian stable, such as adding an Apt pin to pull in only the obfs4proxy package and its dependencies from Debian jessie and keep everything else pinned to stable. If someone has done this, or has another simple solution, would you mind writing up some short how-to on the steps you took, please?
tools/Week-of-Mon-20150202/001119.html [1]: https://github.com/yawning/basket
All of obfs4proxy's dependencies are build time. The binary is statically linked because that's what Go does. David S.'s ansible-tor package does it like this:
https://github.com/david415/ansible-tor/commit/ f897581daa79389ddcb28c7dae601473e85e8226
So the documentation should be a matter of "how to setup the apt pin for a single package". I've heard someone complaining about the tor AppArmor profile but that also isn't something I've dealt with ever.
Regards,
-- Yawning Angel
[0]: I just scp the binary to my bridge whenever I need to update it, and my idea of how to update all my linux systems starts with "pacman" and not "apt-get". _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
-- http://www.backbox.org http://www.pentester.iz.rs
tor-relays mailing listtor-relays@lists.torproject.orghttps://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015 11:50:48 +0100 Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote:
So it's probably safer to wait for obfs4proxy to show up in Ubuntu repositories. Is there already a plan for that?
There are no plans for this currently, and it is unlikely to happen unless someone steps up to do it.
Regards,
Ok, I'll bite: what would somebody have to know to make this happen?
--- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-16 15:39, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Sat, 14 Feb 2015 11:50:48 +0100 Alexander Dietrich alexander@dietrich.cx wrote:
So it's probably safer to wait for obfs4proxy to show up in Ubuntu repositories. Is there already a plan for that?
There are no plans for this currently, and it is unlikely to happen unless someone steps up to do it.
Regards,
-- Yawning Angel
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Alexander Dietrich transcribed 0.9K bytes:
Ok, I'll bite: what would somebody have to know to make this happen?
I know nothing of Ubuntu's policies for package inclusion in their distribution channels; you might try asking their developers. However, obfs4proxy will likely never be included in Debian wheezy-backports. [0]
[0]: http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201...
A couple of posts later in that thread, Lunar points out that obfs4proxy is in the Tor Project's package repo: http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201...
Problem solved!
Thanks, Alexander --- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-17 02:09, isis wrote:
Alexander Dietrich transcribed 0.9K bytes:
Ok, I'll bite: what would somebody have to know to make this happen?
I know nothing of Ubuntu's policies for package inclusion in their distribution channels; you might try asking their developers. However, obfs4proxy will likely never be included in Debian wheezy-backports. [0]
-- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
For anyone else who might be trying to run obfs4proxy from Tor 0.2.5 on Ubuntu 14.04, you need to make two changes to the AppArmor configuration:
Permission to run obfs4proxy: https://www.mail-archive.com/debian-bugs-closed@lists.debian.org/msg469022.h...
Permission to kill obfs4proxy: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13716
Best regards, Alexander --- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-21 14:23, Alexander Dietrich wrote:
A couple of posts later in that thread, Lunar points out that obfs4proxy is in the Tor Project's package repo: http://lists.alioth.debian.org/pipermail/pkg-anonymity-tools/Week-of-Mon-201...
Problem solved!
Thanks, Alexander
PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x727A756DC55A356B
On 2015-02-17 02:09, isis wrote:
Alexander Dietrich transcribed 0.9K bytes:
Ok, I'll bite: what would somebody have to know to make this happen?
I know nothing of Ubuntu's policies for package inclusion in their distribution channels; you might try asking their developers. However, obfs4proxy will likely never be included in Debian wheezy-backports. [0]
-- ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft _________________________________________________________ OpenPGP: 4096R/0A6A58A14B5946ABDE18E207A3ADB67A2CDB8B35 Current Keys: https://blog.patternsinthevoid.net/isis.txt
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
-
Alexander Dietrich -
Igor Chelnokov -
isis -
Yawning Angel -
ZEROF