This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF?
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
-Jason
jason@icetor.is wrote:
This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF?
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talk SOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut down by currency counterfeiters (e.g., the Federal Reserve and the central banks of other states, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************
Sorry perhaps I didn't explain well enough. What I was pointing to was that tor could benefit from the idea of cheaply crowd sponsored relays that use ansible, chef or puppet to spin up for a month. That the article is about bitcoin is merely coincidental. -J On 06/26/2014 05:35 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
jason@icetor.is wrote:
This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF?
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talkSOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut down by currency counterfeiters (e.g., the Federal Reserve and the central banks of other states, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
- Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org *
*--------------------------------------------------------------------*
- "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good *
- objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *
- -- a standing army." *
- -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 *
jason@icetor.is wrote:
Sorry perhaps I didn't explain well enough. What I was pointing to was that tor could benefit from the idea of cheaply crowd sponsored relays that use ansible, chef or puppet to spin up for a month. That the article is about bitcoin is merely coincidental.
No, I got that okay. I was making a tangential point. The juxtaposition of the two projects seemed worth a comment in support of hidden service ideas. And, yes, the notion of crowd-sponsorship of relays is good, although perhaps a feature to encourage longer-term availability might be better.
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************
Hoi,
At hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl we have been toying with the exact same idea and I think Moritz had the same idea too. Cheap crowd sponsored relays are interesting for several reasons, you feel part of the process as a donator. Next to the fact that, at least we came up with that, that you get statistics of how many people you have helped on to the Tor network, with maybe a few links to relevant censorship news around the world. The donor feels warm from the inside and we get to grow the Tor network.
There is work to be done on this, but there is also already work done on this, I guess we just need someone to coordinate all of this.
All the best, Jurre
On 06/26/2014 03:09 PM, jason@icetor.is wrote:
Sorry perhaps I didn't explain well enough. What I was pointing to was that tor could benefit from the idea of cheaply crowd sponsored relays that use ansible, chef or puppet to spin up for a month. That the article is about bitcoin is merely coincidental. -J On 06/26/2014 05:35 AM, Scott Bennett wrote:
jason@icetor.is wrote:
This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF?
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talkSOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut down by currency counterfeiters (e.g., the Federal Reserve and the central banks of other states, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG
- Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org *
*--------------------------------------------------------------------*
- "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good *
- objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments *
- -- a standing army." *
- -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 *
tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On 06/26/2014 09:33 AM, Jurre van Bergen wrote:
Hoi,
At hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl we have been toying with the exact same idea and I think Moritz had the same idea too. Cheap crowd sponsored relays are interesting for several reasons, you feel part of the process as a donator. Next to the fact that, at least we came up with that, that you get statistics of how many people you have helped on to the Tor network, with maybe a few links to relevant censorship news around the world. The donor feels warm from the inside and we get to grow the Tor network.
There is work to be done on this, but there is also already work done on this, I guess we just need someone to coordinate all of this.
Yes, this was one of the ideas I had when I started torservers.net. The quick way was to offer "your own relay" (relay nickname, custom DNS, custom page on IP:80), which we offered from the beginning. Of course it would be nice(r) to have a user interface where you can "spin up your own relay", watch fancy statistics etc -- especially interesting for bridges, where you can now display where the actual users of the bridge came from using OnionOO. My idea was to still run dedicated Gbit/s exit relays, because it is the cheapest "bang for buck", but tune down the fast "unassigned" exit relay and spin up a new instance on a separate IP whenever a user joins the club.
The natural thing to combine this with would be a billboard where you can compete with other relay operators, reach GruntMaster 6000 level etc.
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 12:35:00AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
jason@icetor.is wrote:
This seems pretty damn similiar to something we should be offering for Tor relays, possibly even exits and bridges (if they only run for a month at a time). Possibly co-ordinated through the EFF?
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talkSOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut down by currency counterfeiters (e.g., the Federal Reserve and the central banks of other states, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury). Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
I am using btcd, an alternative full-node implementation written in golang. Find it at https://github.com/conformal/btcd. It has built in proxy support. The wallet, btcwallet, is separate. It also has proxy support, so that you may connect to btcd over tor or as a tor hidden service. That can be found at https://github.com/conformal/btcwallet.
bitcoind nodes are a nice target to look for wallets. But with btcd, I run that at home while btcwallet runs on my encrypted laptop which connects to btcd over tor. There is no wallet on my btcd node machine.
If you're interested in development, testing, or features, see https://github.com/conformal/btcd/wiki#Contact
- David
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 10:44 AM, David Hill dhill@mindcry.org wrote:
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 12:35:00AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
jason@icetor.is wrote:
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talkSOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut
bitcoind works fine with tor and has some onion full nodes.
Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
Performance of hidden services is actually rather good. ymmv.
I am using btcd, an alternative full-node implementation written in golang. Find it at https://github.com/conformal/btcd. It has built in proxy support. The wallet, btcwallet, is separate. It also has proxy support, so that you may connect to btcd over tor or as a tor hidden service. That can be found at https://github.com/conformal/btcwallet.
bitcoind nodes are a nice target to look for wallets. But with btcd, I run that at home while btcwallet runs on my encrypted laptop which connects to btcd over tor. There is no wallet on my btcd node machine.
grarpamp grarpamp@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 10:44 AM, David Hill dhill@mindcry.org wrote:
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 12:35:00AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
jason@icetor.is wrote:
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-secu...
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs could be taught to talkSOCKS, then it seems that tor hidden services would, in principle if not in performance, be an ideal solution. Running those bitcoin "full" nodes as hidden services might well make them less vulnerable to being shut
bitcoind works fine with tor and has some onion full nodes.
Ah, very good, then. Thanks for the info.
Performance of hidden services, however, are severely constrained by the hidden services protocol, which can slow connection times enough to make one consider USnail as a possible alternative, and the need for circuits of 2n-1 relays, which makes access even slower than normal tor circuits of n relays.
Performance of hidden services is actually rather good. ymmv.
In my experience, it can take a minute or more to get a circuit connected because of the delays involved in the whole rendezvous procedure. Then, due to the length of the circuit, the data transfer rate is often fairly poor. Occasionally, the 5- or 7-hop circuit comprises only fast nodes, so the transfer rate is high, but usually the greater number of hops drastically reduces the probability of getting a fast circuit.
I am using btcd, an alternative full-node implementation written in golang. Find it at https://github.com/conformal/btcd. It has built in proxy support. The wallet, btcwallet, is separate. It also has proxy
Excellent.
support, so that you may connect to btcd over tor or as a tor hidden service. That can be found at https://github.com/conformal/btcwallet.
bitcoind nodes are a nice target to look for wallets. But with btcd, I run that at home while btcwallet runs on my encrypted laptop which connects to btcd over tor. There is no wallet on my btcd node machine.
Scott Bennett, Comm. ASMELG, CFIAG ********************************************************************** * Internet: bennett at sdf.org *or* bennett at freeshell.org * *--------------------------------------------------------------------* * "A well regulated and disciplined militia, is at all times a good * * objection to the introduction of that bane of all free governments * * -- a standing army." * * -- Gov. John Hancock, New York Journal, 28 January 1790 * **********************************************************************
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