On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Andy Isaacson adi@hexapodia.org wrote:
Yes, there are cases of law enforcement seizing all computer gear from a house with a exit node -- not just the exit node computer. Most recently in Austria in a child porn investigation.
[...]
We did some operational planning for this risk, in conjunction with the university legal and IT departments, when we set up the CMU Tor exit.
The machine is in a cube farm filled with other equipment that people need for their work; this is because we want to have immediate physical access to it in an emergency, and anywhere else we could put it would interfere with that. However, it has its own dedicated IP address, it runs absolutely no other services, it is clearly labeled both in DNS and on the physical box, and there's nothing else on the table it sits on. The hope is that this will be sufficient to persuade law enforcement to seize *only* that machine, if it comes to it.
Of course, it helps as much or more to have the equipment under the aegis of an organization with lawyers already briefed and on tap, and that has trained all the staff to call legal *before doing anything else* when the police show up.
Also, the greater operational threat is having the plug pulled by one's connectivity provider. I personally would not risk having an exit node in my house for that reason alone.
zw
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 01:23:13PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Andy Isaacson adi@hexapodia.org wrote:
Yes, there are cases of law enforcement seizing all computer gear from a house with a exit node -- not just the exit node computer. Most recently in Austria in a child porn investigation.
We did some operational planning for this risk, in conjunction with the university legal and IT departments, when we set up the CMU Tor exit.
Similarly for Noisebridge / Noisetor, we decided to host at a commercial facility separate from our "production servers" both for cost-per-bandwidth and separation-of-risk reasons.
I don't think it's very likely that cops would bust down a door at CMU to sieze equipment under an ill-conceived investigation; having an institution is quite helpful in getting the cops to actually do their jobs and validate their suspicions. (Unfortunately.)
Also, the greater operational threat is having the plug pulled by one's connectivity provider. I personally would not risk having an exit node in my house for that reason alone.
In my case (and, I suspect, most of us "well paid techies"), I would be back online with new hardware and a 4G modem a few hours after the cops finished their smash-and-grab, so while losing the higher bandwidth of the fixed line and the use of my hardware would be quite inconvenient, it wouldn't be the end of the world. It's important to have a contingency plan for this case, though.
-andy
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 6:50 AM, Andy Isaacson adi@hexapodia.org wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 01:23:13PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Andy Isaacson adi@hexapodia.org wrote:
Yes, there are cases of law enforcement seizing all computer gear from a house with a exit node -- not just the exit node computer. Most recently in Austria in a child porn investigation.
We did some operational planning for this risk, in conjunction with the university legal and IT departments, when we set up the CMU Tor exit.
Similarly for Noisebridge / Noisetor, we decided to host at a commercial facility separate from our "production servers" both for cost-per-bandwidth and separation-of-risk reasons.
Physical standoff distance and preparation is certainly best. Similarly, has anyone ever put a Tor/EFF exit relay notice and contact info on their door? Let their neighbors and/or flatmates know? Consulted with agencies likely to service warrants? Not to stop such legal process, but to lessen through education some of the risks involved.
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 06:20:29PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
Similarly, has anyone ever put a Tor/EFF exit relay notice and contact info on their door? Let their neighbors and/or flatmates know? Consulted with agencies likely to service warrants? Not to stop such legal process, but to lessen through education some of the risks involved.
Noisebridge has a flier which is printed and available near the door. Part of the material is aimed at the volunteer who answers the door to the law enforcement official; part of the material is aimed at the official. The material is at
https://www.noisebridge.net/wiki/Noisebridge_Tor/FBI
Since the volunteer who opens the door probably hasn't been directly trained to handle this situation, it's difficult to provide really good management of the situation.
Also since the IP address is obviously not at the physical address of the hackerspace, and the primary contact for LE is by phone, there aren't very many visits. We've gotten visits from the Secret Service and the FBI and the volunteers report that it has been straightforward. Haven't had a visit or a call in several months; I suspect the word has gotten around the office that it's not a fruitful avenue of investigation.
-andy
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