On 29 Sep 2015, at 09:39, Jeff Burdges burdges@gnunet.org wrote:
The issue I do see is that SPV validation doesn't work well unless you ask multiple peers to make sure that you're getting the chain with the most PoW. So I gather that this would require connecting to Namecoin peers running on multiple exit nodes. I don't think that's problematic, but it would have to be taken into account.
This is no different from validation for existing DNS results. Tor attempts to prevent this by building a list of bad exits, but it's challenging to catch an exit that attacks only one website.
You could check multiple peers but that costs you some anonymity. If you use many .bit names, this might expose the fact that you use Namecoin to your guard.
How do you anticipate this exposure happening? Via traffic correlation?
As far as I understand, your guard only sees your encrypted traffic, and not your exit(s) or your DNS queries.
Tim
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)
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